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Introduction
Can the relatively slow growth of the formal sector in Mexico during the 1990s be attributed to a
rigid labor market and to low turnover rates? Is the increasing share of workers in the informal
sector and of self-employed workers evidence of market segmentation, and hence a source of
inequality and poverty?  Or, as suggested by Maloney (1997), could the relatively large and
symmetric flows of workers among all sectors (formal, informal, self-employed, unemployed,
etc.) be “more consistent with a well-integrated market where workers search across sectors for
job opportunities than one where informal workers seek permanent status in the formal sector
and stay until they retire?”
1
What characterizes the workers who are likely to stay for long in the formal sector when
they enter it, and what characterizes those with low probabililties of leaving informal sectors and
unemployment? When workers leave these statuses, what determines the other statuses to which
they move? Has the pattern of mobility between the formal and informal sectors and between
these two sectors and self-employment and other job statuses been modified by the increased
flexibility in labor contracts and by the structural changes of the 1990s?
We address these questions by means of an analysis based on duration models and
continuous semi-Markov processes. With hazard and transition intensities functions for 1991 to
1998 for the formal sector and other job statuses in which the labor force is commonly grouped
in a semi-industrialized economy
2 we estimate, among other parameters: a) the time spent by
different groups in each job status, b) the factors which influence the probability that a worker
will leave a job status, given that he or she has stayed in that sector up to that point in time, and
c) what the next job status is likely to be when a person moves out.
We measure the extent to which work experience, training courses, level of school
education and other variables, such as being in the service sector or working in a firm with fewer
than 15 employees, affects the probability of remaining in the formal sector. We show that these
variables are also important determinants of job mobility out of the informal sector and self-
employment.
A number of studies of the relative degree of mobility in the labor market  of
industrialized economies have addressed problems which are also relevant in a context such as
the Mexican case. On the one hand, Fougere and Kamionka (1992) showed for France that, by
assessing how frequent and likely is the mobility between bad and good jobs in a country, it is
possible to consider such mobility’s social implications.
3
                                                       
1 Maloney, (1997, p. 13).
2 These are: informal sector, self-employment, unemployment, unpaid jobs, commission or percentage and out of the
labor force.
3 These authors considered whether the dual nature of French labor market was leading to a segregated society,
which would be the case if it were the same people who always end up in bad jobs. They showed that their
estimations are also useful to consider the opposite case, namely that bad jobs play a role in the insertion of workers
into the labor market, as a source of professional experience. Indeed, as Saint Paul (1996) stressed, an assessment of
the heterogeneity in the transition probabilities of different groups is required to determine if a core of  “stayers”
within each group are unlikely to find a good job.6
On the other hand, studies of the dynamics of labor markets (e.g., Saint-Paul et al., 1998,
for France and the U.S.) have illustrated how job separation and hiring rates determine aggregate
unemployment rates in industrial economies. These studies show how two countries may end up
with the same shares of employment and unemployment in the total labor force, even though the
working of their labor markets might be quite different. The difference is explained in terms of
the different degrees of flexibility and mobility implied by their different job separation and
hiring rates.
Extending the implications of these latter studies, it follows that two semi-industrialized
countries may end up having a similar share of formal, informal and self-employed workers in
the total labor force, although the propensities of workers to move from (into) one sector of
employment or job status to (from) another one may be different. Addressing the Mexican case
from this perspective, we show that aggregate shares of workers in different job statuses of its
labor force for the periods 1991-1994 and 1994-1997 can be interpreted as being determined in
terms of: a) the estimated hazard rates of leaving a status, b) the determinants of moving into
another status, and c) the long-run equilibrium state occupancy probabilities obtained from the
semi-Markov process implied by these kinds of processes (Lancaster, 1990).
This paper is structured in three sections. The first discusses stylized facts of the Mexican
labor market, among them quarterly variations in the relative shares of different job statuses
during the decade and indicators of the stability of employment relationships in Mexico, such as
four and six-year job retention rates, which are calculated by means of a “synthetic cohort”
followed over time.
The first section also presents a number of transition matrices to compare a person’s job
status at a certain point in time with the status that he or she had three and six months earlier.
Based on the information provided by workers, we discuss high-frequency movements by
workers from one job status to another.
The first section additionally discusses Mexican labor regulations involving job
dismissals, why these regulations constitute a potential source of conflict and why these
regulations, together with provisions related to seniority premiums, might be causing successful
and productive matches to end sooner than would otherwise be optimal. To empirically assess
this possibility, we consider fired employees for the years 1991-1997 who were registered in the
formal and informal sectors. We search for spikes in the hazard rate of being fired that could be
associated with a discrete jump in firing cost that occurs in Mexico before the fifteenth year of
tenure. In turn, some aspects of labor flexibilization for 1995—such as labor contracts or firms’
internal working agreements regulating firing of workers, subcontracting and hiring of temporary
workers—are also included in the analysis of determinants of job stability in the manufacturing
sector.
Section 2 addresses the following questions: how long does it take before workers in the
formal, informal and self-employment sectors, respectively, move into another job status
(including unemployment and out of the labor force), and what are the respective odds that such
movements will take place among groups with different experience, education, age and other
characteristics?7
The results of duration models and the hazard rates of leaving the formal, informal and
self-employment sectors are presented in this section. Finally, transition intensities implied by
our six job statuses duration model are estimated and analyzed, and the results of duration
models for the manufacturing sector are also presented.
Section 3 deals with the long run equilibrium state occupancy probabilities obtained by
considering the continuous time semi-Markov process specified in this study.  The section
addresses the following question: given the time that each worker spends in the formal sector or
in any other job status (including self-employment, unemployment and out of the labor force),
what is the probability that a certain type of worker will “eventually” be found in the formal
sector and in each of the other job statuses?
1.  Stylized Facts in the Urban Labor Market
1.1 Trends in Job Status, 1987-1998
Our point of departure in this study is the idea that problems in the functioning of Mexico’s
labor market must be analyzed within a context broader than answering only what determines
being unemployed
4 and the time spent until a job is found.
5 Therefore, we posit that the question
should also include asking what determines being in non-formal job statuses, how long workers
stay there, what determines moving to another job status and, when they move, to which status
are they likely to move.
Answers to these questions would help us to assess whether the relatively large and
increasing share of self-employed, informal sector and persons working without payment or by
commission is a reflection that the labor market in Mexico is not allowing workers to move to
their best uses in a short period of time.
6 Alternatively, it may be possible to assess whether the
existence of such a large and growing non-formal sector greases the wheels of the labor market.
Stated differently, these answers may help us to answer whether there are welfare and efficiency
costs associated with the pattern presented in Figure 1, which highlights the lack of growth in
the formal sector over time. Indeed, as shown in the figure, the only period in which the net
generation of jobs in the formal sector (defined here as the set of workers registered in the social
security institutions, IMSS and ISSSTE, as they are called in Mexico
7) appears to have grown
relatively fast in Mexico is during 1990-1991.
8
                                                       
4 In Mexico, workers cannot afford open unemployment—the lack of unemployment insurance combined with their
very low savings forces them to take low paying jobs in which they are less productive than they would be in their
best use. Hence the urban unemployment rate (which remained between 3 and 5 per cent during the seven years
period previous to the 1994 crisis and rose to a peak of around 8 per cent in 1995) is therefore an incomplete
indicator of “unavailability of adequate employment opportunities” during a recession or during structural
adjustment.
5 Revenga  and Riboud have addressed this topic for the case of Mexico (1993) and (1994).
6 Even if human capital does not depreciate as a consequence of an involuntary departure from the formal sector, a
job in the informal sector may be perceived by employers to reflect a depreciation of human capital, so that a worker
who consequently re-enters the formal sector will receive a lower wage than in his previous job in the formal sector.
7 For many workers the formal sector implies more than having access to social security services, for example, it
implies severance payments in the event of being fired, and other rights offered by labor legislation.
8 This period was characterized not only by relatively high GDP growth, but also by the more flexible application,
relative to 1988 and 1989, of wage and price norms to control inflation.8
The figure also shows that, during the period 1987-1989 the share of jobs in the formal
sector diminished with a corresponding increase in the share of self-employment: by the end of
1989 this latter share increased to a figure of 22%, from 20% in 1987, while the share of the
informal sector remained constant. (Informal employees are defined as wage- earning workers not
registered in the social security institutions, while the self-employed  consist of non-wage
earners working on their own account, including bosses.)
Also noticeable in Figure 1 is that the share of workers in the formal sector, which
fluctuated between 41% and 49% for the period 1987 to 1997,  presents a sharp decline  during
the 1995 recession—by more than three percentage points in only one year. The figure also
shows the failure of formal sector employment to recover even after the boom that began in
1997. This failure is reflected, in part, in an increase in the corresponding share of the informal
sector and partly in a larger share of self-employment.




























































In Subsection 1.3.2 and Section 3 we show that the proportions of different job statuses in
the urban labor force, as represented in Figure 1, are determined by exit rates (or hazard) from
one job status to another and by how likely destinations depend on workers’ characteristics.9
1.2 Employment Stability and Job Retention Rates
We present in this subsection a description of job tenures in Mexico and an analysis in which a
“synthetic cohort” of urban workers, whose job tenure is known, is followed over time during
periods of four and six years. This involves a comparison of the number of workers classed by the
length of their current work and age groups in order to provide, based on changes in job status, a
first estimate of the probability of remaining in a job status for four or six years more. The
estimate in turn enables us to establish international comparisons of the stability of the
employment relationships.
9
We consider first the results of Table 1, which indicate that mean and median job tenures
in Mexico are short, compared to those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain, as
well as the average of OECD countries.
10  They also show that about one out of four urban
workers in the formal sector in Mexico had less than two years in their job at the end of the first
half of 1995, a figure only slightly below that of the weighted average for the OECD countries.
In contrast, one out of two workers in the informal sector reported having less than two years in
their job and 25% of wage earners in the informal sector reported having been in their jobs not
more than six months.
At the other side of the tenure spectrum, Table 1 shows that the percentage of workers
with more than ten years in the same job is twice as high for the formal sector than it is for those
with jobs in the informal sector. As a result, the median tenure of the latter is only two years,
while the corresponding figure for the formal sector is four years.
                                                       
9 We follow the format presented by the OECD (1997) in its analysis of job stability in OECD countries, which did
not include Mexico (despite the fact that it is a member). These data can also be compared with those analyzed by
Anderson-Shaffner (1996) for Colombia.
10 OECD (1997, pp. 141-142).10



































13.8 7.1 11.8 25.4 17.3 15.3 9.2 6.53 3.50
Formal
sector
8.7 7.0 11.7 26.5 18.8 18.2 9.0 6.87 4.00
Informal
sector
24.8 10.0 15.0 24.2 13.7 7.8 4.5 4.12 2.00
Self
employed




10.6 6.9 10.2 17.9 19.1 20.5 16.3 8.8 6.7
United States 12.6 13.4 8.5 20 19.8 16.8 9.0 9.8 6.7
United
Kingdom
10.5 9.1 10.7 19.5 23.5 17.3 9.4 7.8 5.0
Spain 27.3 8.2 4.9 11.1 14.4 17.7 16.5 8.9 4.6
Source: INEGI (1995) and OECD (1997, Table 5.5).
The retention rates that are presented in Table 2 approximate the probability that workers
with a particular level of tenure today will have an additional t years of tenure in t years. In order
to do this, we obtain the ratio of the number of workers who are age x+6 with tenure t+6 in 1997
to the number of workers who are age x with tenure t in 1991, thereby obtaining the six year
retention rate for a group of workers with given characteristics. The corresponding figure for
four year retention rates (1991-1995 and 1993-1997) is similarly calculated.11













21.0 27.6 20.6 49.7
Four years retention
rate for 1993-97
20.8 29.7 22.1 43.4
Six years retention
rate for 1991-97
12.3 17.6 13.3 30.3
Gender Age
Men Women 15-24 25-44 45+
Four years retention
rate for 1991-95
26.6 16.0 10.1 29.3 30.7
Four years retention
rate for 1993-97
25.2 16.7 10.3 28.7 30.4
Six years retention
rate for 1991-97
15.7 9.3 5.4 18.1 17.8
95 mean tenure years 6.96 5.75 2.26 6.10 13.01
Level of education
Primary Secondary Tertiary University
Four years retention
rate for 1991-95
20.3 16.2 19.2 6.2
Four years retention
rate for 1993-97
19.9 17.5 19.8 6.3
Six years retention
rate for 1991-97
12.0 9.8 11.5 3.8
95 mean tenure years 7.37 5.41 5.25 4.99
Table 2 indicates that workers in the informal sector change jobs more often than those
in the formal sector: from the second column of this table it follows that out of 100 workers
holding a job in the formal sector in 1991, not more than 28 of them lasted four more years with
the same employer. It also follows that of those 28 workers, around ten of them were no longer
with the same employer two years later.
11
Although self-employment tends to be, by its nature a stable activity, results in Table 2
suggest that after six years a very high percentage of the self-employed (70%) would not be
engaged in the same activity
                                                       
11 For comparisons with job retention rates in developed countries (some of them twice as high as those obtained
here) Cfr. OECD (1997, p.141). It is possible to show that the probability of job changes declines with tenure, when
as in Anderson Schaffner (1996), retention rates are calculated for disaggregated levels of initial tenure.
Source: Own calculations based on data from INEGI, Enece surveys 1991,1993,1995,1997
*Datasets were adjusted to avoid calculation biases due to geographical enlargement of surveys with time (17 cities
for comparisons with 1991 and 34 cities for comparisons with 1993)12
Another interesting result is that four-year retention rates for wage earners are slightly
higher during the period 1993-1997 than during 1991-1995. It suggests that the period including
the years 1991-1993 partly reflects the fact that labor market adjustments were associated with
the effects of the NAFTA agreement signed in 1993. In other words, the period leading up to
NAFTA, when most trade liberalization took place, was associated with a higher level of job
turnover.
  The only available retrospective survey that refers to more than one job was applied to
workers in the manufacturing sector in the final quarter of 1993.
12  Of those workers answering
that they have had more than two paid jobs, we can know, as the Table 3 indicates, that one out of
every two of them did not last more than two years in his/her previous jobs.
 
  The two-year retention rates for workers in the manufacturing sector calculated for the
years 1995-1997 (calculated following the methodology used in subsection 1.2) suggest a low
probability of lasting more than two years in the manufacturing sector. As shown in Table 3, it is











0 to 6 months 27.98% Mean 7.0 3.6 3.1
>6 months to 1 year 29.63% 90% 17.0 12.0 7.0
>1 up to 3 years 29.60% 75% 10.0 8.8 4.0
>3 up to 5 years 42.49% 50% 4.3 2.0 2.0
>5 up to 10 years 42.79% 25% 1.9 1.0 1.0
>10 up to 20 years 51.01% 10% 0.7 0.5 0.5
> than 20 years 60.16%
Standard Dev. 7.4 4.5 3.6
Number of Obs. 7,665 5,668 3,634
Source:  ENECE &  ENEU
Surveys
Source: ENTRAM 93 Survey
In the following subsection we base our analysis on the panel-linked structure of
employment surveys. This feature enabled us to follow interviewed persons for up to five
consecutive quarters—tracking four fifths for one quarter, three fifths for two, two fifths for three
and one fifth for five quarters—thereby identifying if and when they changed job status. This
approach is in contrast to the artificial cohorts approach considered in this subsection; although it
enables us to refer to a longer period of time, tenure and other data were obtained from cross-
section surveys, with no panel structure, for persons interviewed in 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997.
                                                       
12 As opposed to the case with the  ENEU, the  ENTRAM survey (Encuesta  Nacional de  Trabajadores
Manufactureros) was applied to workers the manufacturing sector. In each establishment of the ENESTYC sample,
15 workers were randomly selected. (Out of the 8 categories of employees found in the ENESTYC surveys, e.g., 3
blue-collar workers, 3 specialized, 3 non-specialized, 1 supervisor, etc.).
13 By identifying workers in their activity sector, it is possible to use, as in Calderón-Madrid (1998), our panel structure
to consider how workers move within type of activity.13
In Section 2 we discuss how the identification of “completed spells of employment”—
together with “incomplete spells” or censored data—enabled us to estimate the hazard functions
of moving out of a job status by means of duration models. This is possible because of the five-
quarter panel-linked structure of the employment surveys, together with the job tenure
information provided by each of the persons followed in the panel.  In turn, by identifying which
of the six alternative job statuses was the destination of the movers, we can have a more
elaborate analysis, in terms of transition intensities of a competing-risks model.14
1.3 Transition among Sectors: Are Workers Just Playing “Musical Chairs”?
Maloney (1997), sketching patterns of mobility among sectors by considering panels for 1987-
1991, posits that a high degree of mobility of workers characterized the labor market in Mexico.
His analysis is based on a transition matrix that enabled him to compare a person’s job status at a
certain point of time with the status that he or she had twelve months earlier. His analysis
excluded women and persons with a level of education above high school.
Table 4.  Quarterly ENEU Panel, Movers and Stayers One Quarter Later
II-93 to III-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 80.3% 8.8% 1.5% 4.4% 2.4% 2.3% 0.4% 100.0% 22.5%
IS 19.4% 50.4% 3.0% 12.3% 8.1% 4.7% 2.1% 100.0% 11.1%
Un 14.5% 17.4% 19.7% 33.7% 7.8% 4.7% 2.2% 100.0% 1.8%
OLF 2.0% 3.7% 1.8% 86.3% 3.0% 0.9% 2.4% 100.0% 46.0%
SE 4.5% 7.3% 1.3% 11.5% 69.5% 3.8% 2.1% 100.0% 12.1%
Comm 13.6% 14.7% 2.2% 10.3% 12.4% 45.4% 1.4% 100.0% 3.6%
UnP 2.9% 9.0% 1.6% 31.8% 9.4% 2.2% 43.1% 100.0% 2.8%
Total 22.5% 11.3% 2.1% 45.3% 12.1% 3.7% 3.0% 100.0%
II-95 to III-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 81.0% 8.4% 2.3% 3.3% 2.5% 2.3% 0.3% 100.0% 20.5%
IS 14.2% 52.9% 5.2% 12.0% 8.5% 5.2% 2.1% 100.0% 11.0%
Un 10.1% 18.5% 28.1% 25.4% 10.6% 5.0% 2.3% 100.0% 3.4%
OLF 1.4% 3.6% 2.7% 85.3% 3.3% 1.0% 2.7% 100.0% 45.7%
SE 3.5% 7.5% 2.8% 11.0% 68.9% 4.1% 2.2% 100.0% 12.6%
Comm 11.3% 13.6% 4.6% 9.9% 12.4% 46.6% 1.6% 100.0% 3.8%
UnP 1.9% 8.1% 2.6% 32.4% 9.4% 1.9% 43.7% 100.0% 3.1%
Total 20.1% 11.5% 3.8% 44.6% 12.8% 4.0% 3.3% 100.0%
II-97 to III-97 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 83.0% 7.4% 1.3% 3.5% 2.4% 2.1% 0.3% 100.0% 21.7%
IS 15.6% 55.0% 2.6% 12.5% 7.8% 4.5% 1.9% 100.0% 12.3%
Un 15.8% 19.7% 17.6% 32.1% 8.8% 3.9% 2.1% 100.0% 1.9%
OLF 1.9% 4.0% 1.6% 86.0% 3.2% 0.9% 2.4% 100.0% 44.2%
SE 4.2% 7.7% 1.1% 11.0% 70.0% 3.7% 2.2% 100.0% 13.0%
Comm 13.4% 15.5% 1.8% 9.9% 12.5% 45.7% 1.1% 100.0% 3.9%
UnP 2.4% 9.5% 1.4% 32.6% 9.8% 1.8% 42.5% 100.0% 3.0%
Total 22.2% 12.4% 1.9% 43.7% 12.9% 3.8% 3.0% 100.0%
Source: Own calculations with ENEU surveys15
In order to assess the validity of Maloney’s remarks for a more comprehensive set of
data, for a more recent period of time and within a shorter time span, we analyze transitions from
the second to the third quarter for 1993, 1995 and 1997 in our transitions matrices of Table 4.
14
The letters in the left-hand side column of the matrices indicate the job status in which the person
was located in the second quarter of the year. The letters in the upper row indicate the job status
in which they were found three months later. The cells of the main diagonal represent the share
of workers in that job status who have not moved between quarters II and III (i.e., are stayers)
and the other cells indicate to which of the 6 possible sectors or job statuses they moved (formal
and informal sectors, unemployment, out of the labor force, self-employment, paid by
commission or percentage, and unpaid jobs).
15
These matrices highlight that the Mexican economy is characterized by a high frequency
of movements by workers from one job status to another within a time span of one quarter.  The
figures are especially high for wage earners in the informal sector: between 45% and 50% of
those in these status were no longer there three months later. In turn, between 15% and 20% of
formal workers move, in only one quarter, to another job status.
Consider what happens with those who were trying to find a job in June 1995. According
to the employment surveys those unemployed persons who found a job during the third quarter
of 1995 had spent, on average, nine months looking for a job. In turn, as shown in the
corresponding matrix, almost half of those who were trying to find a job in June 1995 were
already working by September.  An equal number of workers found jobs in the formal sector as
became self-employed: 10% found work in each of these job statuses, and about twice as many
found work in the informal sector. These figures contrast with those of the years of economic
expansion, 1993 and 1997, in which around half as many unemployed workers as those who
found a job in the formal sector became self-employed.
The time that an unemployed person spends trying to find a job depends on the
availability and speed of creation of vacancies, which in turn depends on how long it takes
workers who have a job to move out of it. That is, it depends on the frequency of job changes by
workers who have a job—which, as pointed out earlier, appears to be high in the urban market.
The matrices in Table 4 represent those “earmarked” persons interviewed in two
consecutive quarters. The final column of the matrices indicates persons at the initial quarter in
each job status as a percentage of the sum of persons in the seven statuses. In turn, the final rows
refer to the corresponding percentages after one quarter—i.e., persons found during the next
quarter in each job status as a percentage of the sum. By comparing cells in final column with
corresponding cells in final row, an interesting stylized fact arises: the shares that each job status
represents within total population does not vary significantly from one quarter to another, in spite
of significant movements of persons among job status. This implies that the spaces left by the
                                                       
14 Persons under 16 and over 75 were excluded from the dataset. The number of observations, without factor of
expansion, of Table 4 are in Tables 19, 21 and 23 in the Appendix. Additional considerations could be added with
corresponding matrices for the years 1991, 1994 and 1996, which can be found in the Appendix, in Tables 18, 20
and 22.
15 Paid by commission or percentage is answered as such by the interviewed person, whereas unpaid workers are
divided either working with the family or unpaid, but without family relationship in their jobs. Informal workers are
those employees receiving salary but not registered in the social security institutions.16
flow of persons out of one job status and into another one are to a great extent filled by a flow of
persons moving in the opposite direction. This last stylized fact explains why, in spite of relative
frequent movements in and out of different job statuses, the share of workers in the total active
population represented in Figure 1 remains relatively constant across quarters.
For a more explicit relationship between the shares represented in Figure 1, and those
appearing in the matrices, it is possible to re-express the latter by excluding from the analysis
those persons who are out of the labor force.
16  When this is done, it is possible to consider the
flows of workers moving out of one job status and into another.
When we focus on those wage earners who are at the beginning of our panel in 1993, we
find that, as a share of the economically active population (i.e., excluding OLF), formal and
informal workers represented 41.7% and 20.6%, respectively. Of those persons followed from
the second to the third quarter of 1993, more than 8.5% of formal workers—i.e., 3.67% of the
economically active population—moved to the informal sector. During the same period, 3.99%
of the total active population in the informal sector moved to the formal sector (almost one out of
five informal workers). That is, in spite of the high frequency of movements by workers, in net
terms only 0.32% of the total active population moved from the informal to the formal sector.
As a result, the shares of the formal and informal sectors in the total active population do not
change significantly.
In turn, during 1997, another year of economic expansion, the net increase in the formal
sector was 0.54% of the economically active population, whereas during 1995 the corresponding
figure was a net decline of 0.29%. That is, during the period associated with a severe recession,
14.2% of those working in the informal sector during the second quarter of 1995 had found a job
in the formal sector by the third quarter of that year (2.88% of the economic active population),
but at the same time 3.17% of the economic active population that had been in the formal sector
moved to the informal sector.
1.3.1 Underestimation of the Frequency of Changes in Job Statuses with Yearly Comparisons
There are at least three reasons why our results, when compared with those presented by
Maloney (1997), reveal a higher frequency of changes among job status in Mexico, First, as
suggested by previous studies along these lines, particularly Cruz (1994), women change their
job status more often than men, the only group considered by Maloney. Second, major structural
changes (e.g., the  NAFTA agreement) and a more volatile macroeconomic environment
characterize the period 1991-1997, compared to the 1987-1991 period  analyzed by Maloney.
Third, and more important, by comparing the initial state with a state twelve months later,
Maloney’s study allows for the following result: persons who moved out of a job status but
returned to that initial status within the time span of three, six or nine months are considered as
workers who were in that status for the whole year.
                                                       
16 This can be done by dividing the numbers in the cells of the matrices by one minus the share that OLF represents
in the total population. The resulting figures do not necessarily coincide with those in Figure 1, since the numbers
appearing in the cells are not adjusted by the corresponding “factor of expansion,” whereas those used in the figure
are.17
To illustrate the importance of the last kind of change, we present two different transition
matrices; both compare workers’ initial states with their job status two quarters later. The first,
Table 5, compares job status at the end of the year relative to the status two quarters earlier,
ignoring changes registered between June and September and between September and
December. The second matrix, Table 6, classifies as stayers only those who remained in the same
job status during the three quarters in which they were interviewed. In the latter matrix movers
are only those who changed between the third and fourth quarters (thus, those changing between
the second and third quarters were excluded from the matrix).
Table 5.  Quarterly ENEU Panel, Movers and Stayers Two Quarters Later
(Comparing status initial and six months later only)
II-93 / IV-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 20,138 2,359 395 1,365 735 640 84 25,716
IS 2,556 5,953 353 1,733 1,099 661 254 12,609
II-95 / IV-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 19,937 2,348 526 970 670 608 75 25,134
IS 1,981 6,762 507 1,651 1,185 664 255 13,005
II-97 / IV-97 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 24,008 2,045 376 1,144 737 618 107 29,035
IS 2,882 8,406 425 2,144 1,341 711 283 16,192
Consider, for example, what happens with those “earmarked” workers who were in the
formal and informal sectors in the second quarter of 1993, two quarters later. Comparing Table 6
with Table 5, we deduce that results in Table 5 overestimated the number of persons not moving
out of the formal and informal sectors by 8% and 39.5%, respectively.
17 This overestimation is
due to the workers who moved out of the sector between the second and third quarter and with a
further movement between the third and fourth quarter ended up in their initial sector when
interviewed in the fourth quarter.
18
                                                       
17 This figure refers to numbers before applying the factors of expansion to the survey.
18The analysis of these features of the labor market requires a multiple cycle semi-Markovian model, as suggested
by Hopenhayn (1998) in his study of turnover rates in Argentina.
Source: Own calculations with ENEU Surveys18
Table 6. Quarterly ENEU Panel, Movers and Stayers Two Quarters Later
(Comparing status initial and six months later excluding those that changed, but returned three months
later)
II-93 / IV-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 18,608 1,274 199 646 334 305 31 21,397
IS 852 4,265 137 538 337 243 77 6,449
II-95 / IV-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 18,230 1,141 231 385 228 261 18 20,494
IS 725 4,788 174 474 388 261 79 6,889
II-97/ IV-97 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 21,929 978 194 511 275 310 35 24,232
IS 1,030 6,208 186 643 441 268 81 8,857
1.3.2 Long Run Proportions of Workers in Different Job Statuses and their Relationship with
Flow Exit Rates
In Subsection 1.3.1 we show that, in spite of the high frequency of movements by workers, in net
terms shares of each job status as a share of total active labor force did not changed significantly
from one quarter to the other. In this subsection we present the following arguments (taken from
Heckman, 1998) to illustrate how exit rates from different job statuses determine aggregate
shares of the urban labor force. Consider a homogeneous population with only two possible
statuses: employment or non-employment. Pe (t) is the proportion of people who are employed at
time t; Pn (t) is the proportion of non-employed. In Section 3 we generalize the argument to
consider more than two job statuses and, following Lancaster (1990), estimate long run
occupancy probabilities using Mexican data for the periods 1991-1994 and 1995-1998.
The conditional probability of exit from the state in time interval (t+ Dt) is simply the
hazard, (hDt). Thus the probability of exit from the employment state to the non-employment state
is (he Dt) and the probability of exit from the non-employment state to the employment state is (hn
Dt). Hence, we have that the proportion employed in period t + Dt consists of the proportion of
those employed at t, Pe  (t), who do not leave employment  (an event with probability (1- heDt)),
plus the probability that non-employed persons enter employment (an event with probability hnDt).
Viz:
Pe (t+ Dt) = Pe (t)(1- he Dt) + Pn  (t) hn Dt (1)
Similarly, since the conditional probability of remaining in the unemployment state is
1- (hn Dt), we have:
Pn (t+ Dt) = Pe (t)(he Dt) + Pn  (t)(1- hn Dt) (2)
Source: Own calculations with ENEU Surveys19
Rearranging terms, dividing through by Dt and taking the limit we get two differential equations:
dPe (t)/dt = - he Pe (t) + hn Pn  (t)
dPn  (t)/dt  =  he Pe (t)- hn Pn  (t)
(3)
In  steady state,  dPe (t)/dt = dPn  (t)/dt  = 0,  we solve for Pe  and   Pn:   and get:
Pe =    hn /( he + hn  )
Pn =    he/ ( he  + hn )
(4)
These long-run equilibrium proportions or probabilities imply that the larger the exit rate (or
hazard) hn from the non-employment state relative to the exit from the employment state he, the
more likely is the person to be found in the employment state at a point in time. They state that, in
equilibrium, the odds of finding someone in the state of employment state are hn/ he.
Moreover, in the case in which the hazard rates are constant, these odds can also be
represented as the share of mean average duration in each status, since in this case the hazard rate
hi equals 1/mi, where mi is the mean duration in state i. Hence, substituting it in Pe and Pn we
obtain that:
Pe =    me /( me + mn  )
Pn =    mn/ ( me  + mn )
(5)
It can also be shown that the complete paths for the probabilities that states e or n will be













































































                                                       
19 For t large enough, the exponential terms in the equations vanish and we obtain the same results as before (either
in terms of hazards or means).20
1.4 Termination of Contracts and the Severance Payments System
 
Along with major commercial reforms and liberalization measures in areas other than laws
regulating hiring and firing, the functioning of the labor market in Mexico has gone through
changes during the present decade. The relative strength of the enforcement of the labor law has
been changing, although no explicit modification has occurred.   These changes have been
noticed at least since the early 1990s, as exemplified by the following statement of the leader of
the influential telephone company union: “While we have been fighting for the federal labor
legislation not to be modified, firms in practice have been modifying the collective contracts
according to their interests in order to face trade liberalization. It is there where the change is
taking place.”
20
Indeed, there are a number of indications that labor regulation enforcement differs across
industries and firms. Smaller firms are difficult to monitor, for example, and a minimum of 20
workers is required to constitute a trade union.  On the other hand, studies reveal that some
industry specific trade unions have been more prone to accept “modernization” in their
contracts,
21 effectively implying flexibilization of labor regulations. Comparisons of different
degrees of labor flexibility can be established even between new and old factories of the same
firm (e.g., Ford factories in different states of the country).
22
  During the last 30 years there have been no changes in legislation regarding job dismissals
or regarding temporary and fixed-term contracts. According to current labor legislation, temporary
or fixed-term contracts are only allowed for jobs that are temporary in nature and for specific
tasks.
 
  Employment surveys of June 1995 and June 1997 indicate that 46% of those formal
workers without a permanent written contract, or without a written contract of a defined term but
longer than six months, left the formal sector within five quarters, compared to 25% of those
who had such a contract.  (Workers without a written contract of more than six months
represented 17.3% of formal workers in June of those years).
  The law establishes that in the case of individual dismissals without “just cause”
(redundancy or low productivity are not legal grounds for dismissal) the employer has to make a
lump-sum severance payments equivalent to 3 months’ pay plus 20 days’ salary per year of
service. In addition, in the case of workers with more than 15 years of service, the employer is
required to pay a seniority premium of 12 days of salary per year of service rendered.  Hence, there
is a discrete jump in firing costs in Mexico at the fifteenth year, as is shown in Figure 2. The salary
that the employer considers for severance payments and for the seniority premium has a ceiling of
two minimum wages.
23
                                                       
20 Quoted by Zapata (1995, p. 132), from a statement appearing in the newspaper La Jornada in newspaper February
1992.
21 See for example Bouzas and de la Garza (1998).
22 In Mexico, for example, trade unions can and do stipulate additional severance payments above those required by
law. Since 1992 a number of changes in these and other issues have been registered (see STPSS, 1993, OECD, 1996
and Bouzas and de la Garza, 1998).
23 The substantial drop that minimum wages has had during the last ten years has therefore had an effect in reducing
the real cost of severance payments for workers with relatively high salaries.21
 
  There are no data available that could indicate whether severance payments represent a
high financial burden to firms in Mexico.  A national survey of firms in the manufacturing sector
carried out in 1992 and again in 1995 enabled us to estimate the rate of firing in the manufacturing
sector for 1992 and the turnover rate for both years. These results, presented in Table 7, suggest
that the cost of severance payments in 1992 was as high as 7% of the wage bill for the steel
industry, although on average they were below 4% for the manufacturing sector. The table shows
too that, in spite of very high turnover rates in the maquiladora industry, total firing costs are
about half those in the manufacturing sector. This is because most job separations are voluntary










































Monthly 1992 1.0% 1.0% 1.3% 3.4% 1.9%
A  Quitting
rate
1995 - - - - -
Monthly 1992 0.6% 0.9% 0.6% 0.3% 0.5%
B Firing rate 1995 - - - - -
Monthly 1992 1.7% 2.0% 1.8% 3.7% 2.4%
C=A+B Layoffs rate 1995 0.9% 2.2% 3.4% - 2.8%
Monthly 1992 1.8% 1.2% 1.5% 3.7% 2.2%
D  Hiring rate 1995 1.0% 1.4% 1.6% - 2.4%
Turnover 1992 3.5% 3.2% 3.4% 7.4% 4.5%
E=C+D  Rate 1995 1.9% 3.6% 5.0% - 5.2%
Monthly labor 1992 2,293 2,203 2,598 1,389 1,970
Payments (per worker) 1995 3,019 3,089 2,752 - 2,394
Percentage of workers 1992 49.5% 73.6% 42.4% 46.3% 42.9%
 Trained by firm 1995 83.7% 56.2% 85.3% - 63.3%
Average Tenure 1992 4.9 5.2 4.5 3.3 4.9
(in years) 1995 - - - - -
Total Firing Costs 1992 4.4% 6.9% 3.9% 1.8% 3.4%
 (percentage of wages) 1995 - - - - -
Source: Calculated with data from Enestyc Establishment Surveys INEGI  (1992) and (1995).
The way in which payments to dismissed workers are currently regulated by law
represents a potential source of conflict, in addition to the disincentive these payments pose to
the ending of employment relationships no longer desired by either party. Since workers who
resign voluntarily have no right to severance payments, and they do not receive the seniority
premium until the fifteenth year of work, they have an incentive to force their dismissal and be
fired.
Some provisions of Mexican labor legislation, together with the relatively high degree of
discretionality of labor authorities, substantially increase the transaction costs of firms and
workers in ending a job relationship. Among these are the so-called “reinstatement clause”
24 and
that “lost wages” have to be paid until a legal process is finished (i.e., the worker receives wages
for the period between separation and his/her receipt of dismissal payments).  Dávila (1994)
suggests that up to 40% of what a worker receives must be paid to his lawyer, and data from the
Ministry of Labor shows that up to 5,000 “unjustified” dismissals cases are presented each year
for consideration by the labor authorities.
25
While Mexican labor legislation, which dates back to the late 1930s, has as its explicit
purpose protecting workers and ensuring job security, studies have yet to be conducted to consider
whether it is in fact having the opposite effect, as has occurred in other countries. That is, the fact
that a worker is employed in a certain position implies that there are advantages for both employer
                                                       
24 Laid-off workers can ask to be reinstated by filing a case with the Conciliation Board.
25 STPS (1996). p.129.23
and employees in their job match, and the question arises if there are reasons to believe that labor
market regulations could create incentives to destroy the match.
One aspect of Mexican labor legislation that might be causing successful/productive
matches to end sooner than what would otherwise be optimal is  associated with “seniority rights
for promotion”. According to one article of Mexico’s labor legislation, the employer must promote
the worker with the longest tenure of those who have been trained, and not the one who is most
productive. This regulation reduces the incentives for employers to offer training and for workers
to demand it. In addition, this feature can cause workers with little tenure and high potential
productive capacity to leave the firm due to a lack of opportunities for promotion.
Finally, another factor that influences the rate of hiring and firing in Mexico is that the
law prohibits probationary or apprenticeship periods. The costs of training, which must take
place within working hours, have to be absorbed by the employer.
26
1.5 Do Severance Payments Regulations Influence the Timing of Worker Dismissal?: Spikes
in Hazard Rates of Being Fired
 
  As previously mentioned, labor legislation, as in Mexico, in which severance labor costs increase
automatically with tenure might represent a case in which labor market regulations could cause a
match to be destroyed. Moreover, as explained above, there is a discrete jump in firing costs in
Mexico in the fifteenth year (see Figure 2); this feature raises the question of whether current
regulation induces a degree of flexibility above that needed for an efficient reallocation of
workers.
  To address this question we estimate quit hazard rates (the conditional probability that an
employee is fired) for wage earners in the formal and informal sectors, respectively.   If this
specific feature related to the Mexican institutional framework is affecting firms’ layoff decisions,
a spike in the hazard function (the function that relates a worker’s tenure with his or her
probability of exiting employment conditional on having attained that tenure) of workers in the
formal sector will be detected. There is no reason to expect spikes in the sample of workers in the
informal sector, since labor regulations cannot be enforced in that sector.
 
  Our set of “completed spells” data is drawn from those persons who were employed in the
second quarter of 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997 but became unemployed while being followed in the
panel for up to five quarters.
27 The data set also includes those persons who were identified as
unemployed when the panel started.
 
                                                       
26 Raw data shows that the share of workers in the informal sector is reduced as one controls for experience, which
might imply that low productivity workers must acquire experience in the informal sector, before joining the formal
sector.
27 Our definition of unemployed corresponds to individuals without a job within the twelve months period  previous
to the date in which the survey was conducted and refers to those who, having previously worked, were not working
the week before they were interviewed, due to reasons other than holidays or sickness, whether searching for a job
or not. They answered the question, “Why did you leave your last job?” The answer to this question enabled us to
classify the unemployed according to whether they voluntarily left their job or not.24
  As a first step in this direction we rely on the estimation of stratified Kaplan-Maier
estimators (see Kiefer, 1988 and Lee, 1992) to obtain layoff hazard rates for four types of workers
and consider if there are obvious spikes:
28 rates at which employment spells for men and women,
in formal and informal sectors, will be ended after t periods, given that they last until t.
The results are presented in Figures 3 and 4.  When we consider the hazard rates of being
fired in the formal sector (and thus entitled to severance payments) for male workers with tenure
close to 15 years, we find that no relevant spike occurs, suggesting that Mexican legislation has
no counterproductive effects in the case of men. However, the results are not so conclusive for
the case of women.
  Among the reasons why the seniority premium may not have a strong effect is that the
level of salaries (both the 20 days per year and the 12 days per worked year of seniority premium
after fifteen years) is capped at a level equal to two minimum wages (the minimum wage is
established by the government).  Since minimum wages have declined substantially in real terms
in Mexico since 1987, adjustment costs for firms in terms of severance payments have fallen pari
passu. Indeed, after reaching a peak in 1976, the minimum wage in Mexico had lost two thirds of
its real value by 1998.
Spikes in the Hazard of Being Fired
    Figure 3          Figure 4
      Kaplan-Meier for Formal           Kaplan-Meier for Informal
































  Thus, in addition to reducing the incentives to fire a worker before he/she reaches his 15
th
year, this cap reduces financial incentives that employers might otherwise have to avoid actions
which increase wages to employees with high tenure, such as on-the job training.
                                                       
 
28 The parametric hazard functions estimated in the following section do not allow for the calculation of spikes.
Hence a step to follow for a proper estimation of this problem would be to estimate, as in MaCurdy and Alan
(1993), by maximum likelihood a continuous time flexible hazard model with co-variates that allows for spikes, an
elaborate procedure which is left for future research.25
  2.  Duration Models and Parametric Estimation of Hazard and Transition
Intensities Functions.
We use two pieces of information to consider the determinants of mobility in the labor market in
Mexico from one job status to another one: the number of months a person has spent in the job in
which he/she is currently working as well as the job tenure in their last job for those reported as
unemployed (in addition to the length of the unemployment spell). Following these “earmarked”
persons over five quarters, using the panel structure of the employment surveys, we know if,
during this period of time, they stay in the same job status or move to another one. Using this
information and relying on techniques of  “survival” analysis, we estimate not only when and
how different groups of the labor force change from one job status to another, but also how long
they are likely to spend in each job status.
In this section we calculate the odds that a spell of a job in one of the statuses analyzed
here will end in any given month, given that it has lasted up to this time, showing and
quantifying how these odds depend on a number of explanatory variables, such as sex, age,
education and training, among others.  For this purpose we estimate duration models, which have
the distinctive advantage that they can handle censored data effectively (Kiefer, 1988).
29  These
models take as their point of departure the definition of a nonnegative continuous random
variable T, which represents the spell duration with a density function f(t).
In turn, it is established that f(t) has its corresponding  distribution function, F(t). Hence,
the survivor function is simply defined as  1-F(t),  i.e., as the probability  that duration will  equal
or exceed the value t.
It is also established that for any specification of t in terms of a density function there is a
mathematically equivalent hazard function, h(t), which is the conditional density of T given
T>t>0; viz:













t T t f = h(t)
  In this relationship h(t) can be interpreted as an exit rate or escape rate from the state,
because it is the limit  (as D tends to zero) of the probability that a spell terminates in interval (t,
t+ D), given that the spell has lasted t periods (Heckman and Singer, 1985).
 
  In duration models with more than one destination, also called “competing risk
specifications,” spells can end in different ways, as is the case in the transition matrices analyzed
in Section 1. There, a person leaving one job status could go into one of six different destinations.
Hence, the hazard rate of leaving one job status, hi (t), is given by the sum of the hazard functions
                                                       
29 Some people who started a spell of employment/unemployment in a given job status may still have been in the
same status when they are last interviewed. Data for these people are called censored, and they would constitute a
problem for a standard regression model where the dependent variable was the length of the spell. If we exclude
people with unfinished spells, we throw away part of the data set and introduce a serious bias against people with
longer and more recent spells in each of the job statuses.26
of leaving that job status to different destinations, hij(t), which are called transition intensities
functions; viz:
( ) ( ) ￿ =
j ij i t h t h (7)
There is no a priori reason that enables us to assume that different transition intensity
functions have a constant time dependence relationship. A general case, which considers positive
and negative time dependence as particular cases, is a Heckman-Flinn (1982) flexible Box-Cox
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x t h j i ,           2 1 l l <
(8)
where x is a set of co-variates (time invariant  regressors), t represents time. In turn,
2 1 2 1 , , , , l l g g b  are permitted to depend on the  origin state and the destination state. This
specification contains, as special cases, virtually all commonly utilized functions.
30
 
  In the following sections we present results of the particular cases of time dependent
hazard functions for urban employees moving out of three different job statuses:
31 formal and
informal sectors and self-employment. For these cases we estimated monotonic (Weibull) and
non-monotonic (logistic) hazard functions.
32 The former is represented by:
( ) x t = h(t)
1 - ' exp b a
a (9)
 
It is a function which is always monotonic and can capture positive (a >1) or negative time
dependence (a <1),
 
  In turn, the logistic hazard function is:
 




















                                                       
30 For example, the essential features of Jovanovic’s (1979) turnover model can be captured by choosing l1=1
and l2=2. In this case we will expect that g1>0 and g2< 0, so that initial positive duration dependence is eventually
followed by negative dependence.
 
31 Most of the empirical studies that use yearly data have found that the hazard rate of leaving a job declines sharply
with tenure, hence indicating that monotonic time-dependent specifications may be satisfactory (Farber, 1998).
However, some studies (McCall, 1990 and Farber, 1994) have found that, using periods shorter than a year, a more
accurate specification is hazard of a job ending that first increases with tenure before beginning to decline with time.
This last evidence is consistent with a number of theoretical arguments that suggest that hazard functions of employed
wage earners will not be monotonic. For example, Jovanovic’s (1979) turnover model predicts that an initial positive
duration dependence is eventually followed by negative duration dependence.
32 Weibull hazard functions corrected for heterogeneity using gamma distribution, have also been calculated and
some of the results are presented in Calderón-Madrid (1998).27
and is not always monotonic with respect to time; for values of a  greater than one, the hazard
first increases  with duration, then decreases. (If  a < 0  the hazard function decreases with
duration.
 
  In turn, as an approximation to the problem of the competing risk specification, at the end
of this section and in the following section we concentrate on the particular case in which
transition intensities are assumed to be proportional. That is, it is assumed that the intensities of
transition to any pair of destination states are always in the same proportion, i.e., that, given that
departure occurs at t from status i, the probability that it is to job status j does not depend upon t.



































































  where (7)  olds, and therefore  1 = ￿ j ij p .
Relying on this assumption has the empirical advantage that the mij component can be
estimated with the multinomial  logit method, which is not dependent on time. In turn, the
denominator of equation (11), which represents the time dependent hazard of moving out of job
status i, can be estimated with a Weibull hazard function since this specification is a member of the
proportional hazards functions family.
Therefore, time dependent transition intensities can be deduced by means of a hazard
function multiplied by the multinomial logit results, viz.:
( ) ( ) t h m t h i ij ij   = (12)
Hence, with the Weibull hazard functions for each job status on the one hand—to be estimated in
the following subsection—and with the multinomial  logit estimations, on the other hand, we
calculate by means of (12) transition intensities of leaving one job status to move into different
destinations.
  2.1. Hazard Functions for Formal and Informal Sectors and For Self-Employed Persons
 
  We constructed four sets of five-quarter panels with “ear-marked” persons whose job-tenure is
known. These, in turn, have been merged in two sets for estimation purposes: the year 1991 was
merged with 1993 (therefore including from 1991-II to 1992-II together with 1993-II to 1994-II)
and the year 1995 with 1997 (i.e., 1995-II to 1996-II together with 1997-II to 1998-II).
 
  One reason for not estimating the four sets of panels together was to consider episodes
which were not subject to the same kind of changes—e.g., trade liberalization and the NAFTA
agreement in the first, and a severe economic crisis in the second.
33.  Another reason was that a
                                                       
33 Non-wage cost—e.g., social security contributions, paid vacations and year-end bonuses—in formal sector
remained fairly constant during the two periods of study (at around 27% of base salary).28
very worthy question for the analysis of job stability was not included in surveys previous to the
second quarter of 1994, namely, the kind of contract under which the person was employed, if
they had a contract.
 
  Tables 10 and 11 present the results of the Weibull and logistic specifications of hazard
functions for formal, informal and self-employed workers.
34. The co-variates (time invariant
regressors) used were:
 
a)  sex (binary dummy variable that equals one if man, zero if woman).
b)  age (introduced with its value and with its squared value in order to capture non-linear
effects).
c)   position in household, which can be breadwinner, spouse (second salary aboard), son
and daughter or a position different to these ones.
d)  level of formal education (which has been aggregated in six different categories:
incomplete and complete elementary school, secondary school, high school,  echnical
formation and  college).
e)  marital status (dummy equals one if married, zero otherwise).
f)    number of jobs in life.
g)  training course during the last fifteen months: a dummy which equals one for those
persons who answered that they took one.
h)   number of months of working experience.
i)  Type of contract: contract under which the person was employed, if they have one,  (with
a dummy equal one for those having a written contract of indefinite duration or one for a
period longer than six months, a question only available after 1994).
j)  size of firm: a dummy equal one if the person was working in a firm with less than 15
persons, zero otherwise).
k)   working in the service sector (a dummy equal to one if the worker did, zero otherwise).
 
  The estimated hazard functions for the formal sector are represented in Figure 5. In Figure
6 the cases for informal sector wage earners and self-employed persons are presented. These
figures, and the discussion that follows, refer to the estimations obtained with the logistic
specification, because of its better fit, although most conclusions apply for the Weibull cases as
well.
 
  As can be observed in these figures, the period 1991-1994—associated with the years
leading up to the  NAFTA agreement and most structural changes in the economy—displays






                                                       
34 In Table 29 of the Appendix, we present the results for the Weibull hazard functions estimated for the remaining
job status represented in Table 4 of Section 1.
35 It may be adventurous to draw conclusions comparing the two datasets estimated here. There might be a bias
estimation due to an omitted variable in 1991-1994 (type of contract, which is available only for the other data set)
and due to the non-stationary setting to which the analysis refers. Dealing with these kinds of bias, together with
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Urban labor market in Mexico 1991-1994
Formal Unemployed Self Employed Informal
Weibull Logistic Weibull Weibull Logistic Weibull Logistic
Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val
Constant -0.805 0.00 -1.036 0.00 -0.416 0.00 0.021 0.03 -0.086 0.00 0.352 0.00 -0.352 0.00
Sex -0.107 0.00 -0.069 0.00 -0.354 0.00 0.540 0.00 0.277 0.00 0.240 0.00 0.648 0.00
Age 0.205 0.00 0.214 0.00 0.119 0.00 0.172 0.00 0.137 0.00 0.134 0.00 0.179 0.00
Age squared -0.001 0.00 -0.002 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00
Breadwinner 0.415 0.00 0.489 0.00 -0.543 0.00 0.215 0.00 -0.067 0.00 -0.081 0.00 0.232 0.00
Spouse (2nd salary
aboard)
0.193 0.00 0.213 0.00 0.268 0.00 -0.198 0.00 -0.445 0.00 -0.398 0.00 -0.264 0.00
Son/daughter 0.199 0.00 0.199 0.00 -0.032 0.00 -0.041 0.00 -0.324 0.00 -0.295 0.00 -0.095 0.00
Elementary School
Incomplete
0.195 0.00 0.087 0.00 0.005 0.61 -0.079 0.00 0.190 0.00 0.098 0.00 -0.098 0.00
Elementary School
Complete
0.416 0.00 0.322 0.00 0.152 0.00 0.016 0.00 0.098 0.00 0.011 0.00 -0.056 0.00
Secondary 0.517 0.00 0.418 0.00 0.181 0.00 -0.055 0.00 -0.030 0.00 -0.107 0.00 -0.087 0.00
High School 0.424 0.00 0.290 0.00 0.458 0.00 -0.134 0.00 -0.216 0.00 -0.302 0.00 -0.179 0.00
College & Higher 0.267 0.00 0.142 0.00 0.128 0.00 -0.085 0.00 -0.139 0.00 -0.233 0.00 -0.080 0.00
Married 0.040 0.00 0.064 0.00 0.108 0.00 0.048 0.00 -0.001 0.53 0.000 0.66 -0.005 0.04
Jobs in life -0.054 0.00 -0.146 0.00 -0.031 0.00 -0.068 0.00 -0.152 0.00 -0.075 0.00 -0.111 0.00
Training course
last 15 months
0.228 0.00 0.257 0.00 0.013 0.00 -0.140 0.00 0.246 0.00 0.250 0.00 -0.196 0.00
Work experience 0.006 0.00 0.008 0.00 -0.005 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.023 0.00 0.015 0.00 0.005 0.00
Service sector 0.190 0.00 0.231 0.00 -0.364 0.00 -0.029 0.00 0.365 0.00 0.316 0.00 -0.047 0.00
Size of firm -0.440 0.00 -0.490 0.00 -0.646 0.00 -0.342 0.00 0.180 0.00 0.182 0.00 -0.342 0.00
a 1.081 0.00 1.298 0.00 1.110 0.00 1.067 0.00 1.302 0.00 0.963 0.00 1.307 0.00
l 0.07 0.00 0.022 0.00 0.104 0.00 0.064 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.020 0.00
Log likelihood -7228933.20 -7164469.00 -879635.07 -4055954.55 -4092263.02 -5169014.66 -5159878.20
Total observations 8,408,364 8,408,364 633,789 3,794,528 3,794,528 3,769,740 3,769,740
Censored data 5,747,836 5,747,836 48,495 2,022,934 2,022,934 1,236,737 1,236,737
  * Total observations in the survey without factor of expansion were: formal 42,213, self-employed 19,451,







Urban labor market in Mexico 1995-1998
Formal Unemployed Self Employed Informal
Weibull Logistic Weibull Weibull Logistic Weibull Logistic
Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val
Constant -0.646 0.00 -0.961 0.00 0.643 0.00 0.315 0.01 0.112 0.00 1.158 0.00 0.953 0.00
Sex 0.007 0.00 0.034 0.00 -0.225 0.00 0.422 0.00 0.510 0.00 0.178 0.00 0.158 0.00
Age 0.185 0.00 0.192 0.00 0.054 0.00 0.160 0.00 0.159 0.00 0.114 0.00 0.105 0.00
Age squared -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.000 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.000 0.00
Breadwinner 0.198 0.00 0.242 0.00 -0.085 0.00 0.368 0.00 0.403 0.00 -0.437 0.00 -0.292 0.00
Spouse (2nd salary
aboard)
0.065 0.00 0.075 0.00 0.689 0.00 -0.304 0.00 -0.393 0.00 -0.807 0.00 -0.786 0.00
Son -0.063 0.00 -0.100 0.00 0.038 0.00 -0.118 0.00 -0.128 0.00 -0.653 0.00 -0.644 0.00
Elementary School
Incomplete
0.155 0.00 0.019 0.00 0.118 0.00 0.002 0.34 -0.055 0.00 0.081 0.00 0.058 0.00
Elementary School
Complete
0.231 0.00 0.112 0.00 0.247 0.00 -0.146 0.00 -0.204 0.00 -0.072 0.00 -0.055 0.00
Secondary 0.407 0.00 0.339 0.00 0.376 0.00 -0.074 0.00 -0.122 0.00 -0.241 0.00 -0.245 0.00
High School 0.174 0.00 0.103 0.00 0.303 0.00 0.002 0.51 -0.015 0.00 -0.365 0.00 -0.327 0.00
Technological F. 0.186 0.00 0.105 0.00 0.328 0.00 -0.094 0.00 -0.127 0.00 -0.323 0.00 -0.349 0.00
College & Higher -0.081 0.00 -0.155 0.00 0.445 0.00 -0.022 0.00 -0.022 0.00 -0.548 0.00 -0.512 0.00
Married 0.019 0.01 -0.001 0.37 -0.176 0.00 -0.026 0.00 -0.001 0.54 0.009 0.00 -0.041 0.00
Jobs in life -0.057 0.00 0.117 0.00 -0.016 0.00 -0.052 0.00 -0.101 0.00 -0.076 0.00 -0.143 0.00
Training course
last 15 months
0.258 0.00 0.273 0.00 -0.057 0.00 -0.138 0.00 -0.204 0.00 0.106 0.00 0.130 0.00
Type of Contract 0.799 0.00 0.937 0.00 -0.671 0.00 NA NA NA NA 0.772 0.00 0.834 0.00
Work experience 0.003 0.00 0.003 0.00 -0.004 0.00 0.000 0.05 0.001 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.013 0.00
Service sector 0.025 0.00 0.028 0.00 -0.325 0.00 -0.003 0.02 0.016 0.00 0.115 0.00 0.169 0.00
Size of firm -0.247 0.00 -0.297 0.00 -0.867 0.00 -0.249 0.00 -0.303 0.00 0.294 0.00 0.299 0.00
a 1.103 0.00 1.300 0.00 1.275 0.00 1.014 0.00 1.233 0.00 0.956 0.00 1.294 0.00
l 0.06 0.00 0.017 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.019 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00
Log likelihood -6769885.09 -6724247.04 -1556414.20 -5050992.81 -5076143.25 -6013007.27 -5969053.62
Total observations 8,607,919 8,607,919 1,222,021 4,679,641 4,679,641 4,542,868 4,542,868
Censored data 6,183,669 6,183,669 149,931 2,582,955 2,582,955 1,693,385 1,693,385
  * Total observations in the survey without factor of expansion were: formal 25,726, self-employed 14,606,
unemployed 3,124, informal 13,108.
 
As was a priori expected on the basis of theoretical arguments by Jovanovic (1979), the
resulting parameters a of the hazard functions imply that hazard rates first increase and after two
years start declining monotonically for both periods under consideration.  The results show that the
co-variate with the most important weight in explaining the reduction in hazard of leaving the
formal sector during the period 1995-1998 is type of contract, viz, having a written contract for an
indefinite period or one with a definite period longer than six months. Those wage earners hired
with that kind of contract reduced their hazard of leaving the formal sector to half the
corresponding value for other workers.
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  Hazard rates out of the formal sector are also reduced for those workers with education
above elementary school,
36 with secondary education having the most significant effect in
increasing the time spent in a job in the formal sector. The opposite effect is registered in the cases
of employees in the informal sector and in self-employment: persons with formal education spend
less time in these job statuses, compared to workers without it. Moreover, during the period 1995-
1998 having secondary or high school education was more important, relative to what happened
four years earlier, in reducing the odds of staying in the informal sector.
 
  The estimates also indicate that working in a firm with fewer than 15 workers increases the
hazard rates of not staying in a job in the formal sector. This result might be associated with the
fact that, in Mexico, the enforcement of labor regulations differs across industries and firms,
smaller firms being more difficult to monitor. Hence job dismissals in small firms might be
more expeditious. This hypothesis can be reinforced by the fact that a minimum of 20 workers is
required to constitute a trade union.
 
  It is interesting to point out that taking a training course would have helped a worker leave
the informal sector during the period 1991-1994 but not during the period 1995-1998 (the
parameter of the  co-variate actually changed sign). In contrast, having received a training course
within a period smaller than fifteen months reduces the hazard of leaving the formal sector in both
periods.
 
  A final result worth mentioning is that breadwinners were less likely to leave the formal
sector during the period 1991-1994 than during 1995-1997. The same result is obtained for
working spouses of breadwinners (i.e., second salary aboard), although the change is more
pronounced within this latter group.
 
The results of the hazard functions enable us to calculate median time spent by workers in
the formal sector relative to the median time spent by those in the informal sector. These results are
shown in Table 12, together with a comparison across periods. They indicate that median time
spent in the formal sector is more than 3.5 times that in the informal sector during 1995-1998 and




















3.22 3.21 3.20 3.18
 
                                                       
36 Except for college in the period 1995-1998, which actually increases the hazard of leaving the formal sector.33
 
The hazard functions also enable us to calculate hazard rates and survival probabilities for
different groups and for a particular length of time, as in the example presented in Table 13, where
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1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year 1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year
Woman, Age=30, Spouse (2nd salary), High School, 2 jobs in life and 5 years of work experience,
written contract, course training
Formal salaried 0.974 0.849 0.700 0.013 0.995 0.964 0.916 0.001
Informal salaried 0.817 0.446 0.230 0.028 0.951 0.711 0.501 0.015
Unemployed 0.610 0.036 0.000 0.210
Self employed 0.854 0.480 0.242 0.032 0.900 0.554 0.345 0.030
Man, Age=45, Breadwinner, High School, 5 jobs in life and 25 years of work experience, written
contract, course training.
Formal salaried 0.990 0.942 0.878 0.005 0.999 0.998 0.995 0.000
Informal salaried 0.921 0.719 0.549 0.000 0.996 0.972 0.935 0.001
Unemployed 0.305 0.000 0 0.440
Self employed 0.972 0.877 0.776 0.005 0.993 0.954 0.898 0.002
 
2.2 Hazard Functions for Formal Workers in the Manufacturing and Other Sectors
Information associated with relative  flexibilization of labor contracts and changes in labor
organization in the manufacturing sector during 1995 is available in an establishment-based
survey, known by its Spanish acronym ENESTYC.  From this survey, which was representative at
a national level,
37 we used the data provided by the following questions:
Does the collective labor contract, internal working regulations or special arrangements regulate
the following issues?
a)  firing of workers
b)  subcontracting of workers
c)  hiring of  temporary workers
                                                       
37This survey was carried out in 5242 establishments. Their results are representative at a national level for 52
branches of industrial activity and of four sizes according to number of workers (Large: 251 or more, median: 101 to
250, small: 16 to 100 and micro: 1 to 15).34
If the firm has made changes in labor organization in the production area since 1994,  which was
the main change?
e)   Personnel rotation of job positions.
f)  Increase in number or reallocation of duties per worker.
In addition, a question related to formal training opportunities provided by the firm was also
selected, viz:
g)  Does the firm provide formal training to workers, in addition to the one provided by fellow
workers?
In this subsection we use the information from these questions together with data from
employment surveys to assess, by means of hazard functions for the manufacturing sector, how
changes in labor regulation and functional flexibility affected job stability in the formal sector.
In order to link the data provided by the answers to these questions with the data of our panel-
linked employment surveys we followed a number of steps. We first classified firms in 36
different cells, according to nine main manufacturing branches and  four different sizes. With the
information obtained from the firms’ surveys we identified values for each of the 36 cells. The
number of affirmative answers, as a share of the total firms which responded the above stated
questions, constituted the co-variates related to the flexibilization of labor contracts and changes
in labor organization, which were included in the hazard function of the manufacturing sector.
In turn, we eliminated all workers and unemployed persons who did not belong to the
manufacturing sector in the ENECE-ENEU survey.  The remaining persons of these surveys were
then identified according to the “industry-size of firm” cells in which they were registered.
38 As a
final step, the information obtained from the ENESTYC survey was integrated to the data set for
each worker, according the cell to which he/she was related.
The co-variates specified in the hazard functions for the manufacturing sector include, in
addition to the variables related to worker characteristics (obtained from the ENECE and ENEU
survey and referred to in the previous subsection), six variables obtained from the
establishments surveys. Those specified for the non-manufacturing sector were only those related
to worker characteristics.
                                                       
38 With one of the questions of the ENEU is possible to identify the branch to which the firm in he/she worked
belonged to, with another one the number of workers.35
The results are presented in Table 9. All co-variates are significant at a 5% confidence
interval, and a positive sign indicates that the co-variate reduces the hazard of leaving the sector.
 
Table 9










Elementary School Incomplete 0.378 -0.053
Elementary School Complete 0.546 0.262
Secondary School 0.710 0.348
High School 0.603 0.174
Technological Formation 0.494 0.082
College 0.426 -0.149
Training Course 0.262 0.317
Work Experience 0.004 0.000
Contract 0.794 0.969








-0.007             NA
Enestyc: Contract regulates
hiring of temporary personnel
-0.004   NA
Enestyc: Contract regulates
subcontracting
0.013   NA
Enestyc: Implemented personnel
rotation
0.018   NA
Enestyc: Incremented number of
duties per worker
0.013   NA
Enestyc: Training provided by
firm




Log likelihood -935524.6 -2616865
Total observations 1,256,584 3,133,137
       -out of which censored data 919,838 2,162,325
Source: INEGI. ENECE, ENEU and ENESTYC surveys.
*Total observations in the survey without factor of expansion were 4,230
employees for manufacturing and 8,977 for non-manufacturing.36
The estimations indicate that employees of firms in which collective working arrangements
regulate issues associated with flexibilization of labor contracts (firing of workers and hiring of
temporary workers) have higher hazard rates of leaving their jobs in the manufacturing sector
relative to those in which these issues are not regulated. In contrast, when the regulation refers to
changes in labor organization (rotation of job positions and increase in number of duties per
worker), hazard rates diminish.
  In turn, employees who work in industries in which training is provided by the firm have
lower hazard rates than those working in firms that do not. This result is linked to, and acts in the
same direction as, the effect of the co-variate “training course,” which identifies those workers
who actually took a training course during the last fifteen months.
 
  An interesting result associated with the effects of labor legislation within the Mexican
institutional context is captured by the co-variate “contract,” which indicates that the worker has a
written contract for an indefinite period, or for a period longer than six months. The size of the
parameter measuring the effect of having a contract is larger in the hazard function of the non-
manufacturing sector than in the function for the manufacturing sector. This means that, although
in both type of activities having a written contract reduces the risk of moving out of the formal
sector, its effect is less important in the manufacturing sector.
 
  The opposite result is obtained regarding the variable of formal education: the hazard rates
of leaving the formal sector for employees with secondary, high school and technical formation in
manufacturing activities are not only lower than the ones for uneducated workers, but also lower
than the hazard rates of those workers with formal education in the non-manufacturnig sector.
 
  Indeed, as Table 9 shows, the parameters for the different levels of education
corresponding to the hazard function for the manufacturing sector are positive and more than twice
the size of those corresponding to non-manufacturing activities.
 
  Finally, the results also indicate that, unlike what happens with married men, the hazard
rates of leaving a formal job in the manufacturing sector increase for working spouses and sons—a
result not obtained in the case of non-manufacturing activities.
2.4 Hazard Functions with Multiple Destinations
According to surveys of self-employed persons in Mexico,
39 a large percentage of them went to
this job status because they were fired, having previously been salaried workers. In addition, these
surveys also indicate that to start their business, they relied more on their severance payment and
their own savings than on any other source of financing (see Samaniego, 1998).
In the previous subsection we concluded that employees who have a written contract to
work for an indefinite period have lower hazard rates of leaving the formal sector. With the
results to be considered next, it is possible to state that if a worker who has a written contract to
work exits the formal sector, he/she is 25% more likely to have self-employment, relative to the
informal sector, as a destination. Since dismissed workers with written contracts are those likely
                                                       
39 E.g., INEGI (1997).37
to receive severance payments and seniority premiums, these results suggest that dismissals
makes initiating a self-employed job easier.
Given that the amount of severance payments that can be used by dismissed workers to
start their own business increases with tenure, a flexible hazard rate specification is required to
consider these results. That is, in order to consider the effects that severance payment regulations
have on labor market dynamics, the analysis must not discard transition intensity functions such as
those in Figure 8. In this figure, as time elapses there is a change in the relationship between
exits from the formal sector into self-employment (transition intensities) and exits from the
formal sector into the informal sector, hf,se and hf,I, respectively.
These possibilities are left for future research.  In what follows we assume that different
transition intensities functions have a constant time dependence relationship, as, for example, the
functions represented in Figure 7.








We therefore concentrate on the particular case in which proportional intensities are
assumed, as stated by equation (12), repeated below for convenience:
( ) ( ) t h m t h i ij ij   =
This relationship states that it is possible to estimate transition intensities for each job status as a
destination,  hij(t), as the product of the results of a multinomial  logit estimation for different
destinations, mij, multiplied by hazard rates of moving out of each job status, hi (t)—provided that
the function specifying these rates belongs to the family of proportional hazard functions.
The results for the six destination multinomial logit estimations for 1995-1998 and 1991-
1994 are presented in Table 14 for the formal and informal sectors and for self-employed persons.
These results, together with the estimations of hazards of moving out of each job status given by
the Weibull hazard functions of Tables 10 and 11,
40 constitute the required input for the estimation
of the transition intensities functions.
                                                       
40The multilogit results for the remaining job status are in the Appendix in Table 31 and those for the Weibull hazard
functions in Table 29.38
Table 14
















































































































































































































































FS IS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FS Un 0.56 1.22 0.96 1.00 1.37 1.06 1.39 1.55 1.17 1.92 0.87 0.68 1.06 1.00 1.18 1.28 0.27 1.00 0.34 0.63
FS OLF 12.54 0.34 0.83 1.00 1.08 1.73 1.55 2.66 1.04 3.79 1.39 0.64 0.97 0.99 0.85 0.57 2.63 1.00 0.41 0.56
FS SE 0.00 1.97 1.12 1.00 1.04 1.15 1.19 1.49 2.59 1.55 1.25 0.99 1.06 1.01 0.66 2.97 1.36 1.12 0.41 1.44
FS Cm 0.01 2.01 1.11 1.00 1.35 2.08 1.85 2.95 1.25 1.63 1.25 1.15 1.04 1.00 1.26 1.88 0.87 1.00 0.21 0.77
FS UP 0.02 1.85 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.79 2.93 3.88 4.38 1.44 1.00 0.79 1.09 0.98 0.82 0.40 4.15 0.83 0.46 1.07
IS FS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
IS Un 1.13 1.56 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.47 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.35 0.80 1.04 0.99 0.83 1.05 0.93 1.45 1.23 1.70
IS OLF 49.38 0.48 0.81 1.00 0.58 0.31 0.32 0.46 0.17 0.58 0.40 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.89 0.31 2.96 0.91 1.17 2.47
IS SE 0.04 2.10 1.14 1.00 0.45 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.34 1.18 0.95 1.00 0.65 1.13 1.46 0.73 1.33 4.68
IS Cm 0.04 4.23 1.07 1.00 0.99 0.70 0.64 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.31 1.15 0.96 1.00 0.64 1.04 1.23 1.10 0.85 2.71
IS UP 2.28 1.18 0.86 1.00 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.44 0.13 0.62 0.45 1.02 0.78 1.02 0.33 0.06 1.36 1.25 0.36 7.52
SE FS 0.00 7.32 1.28 1.00 1.36 2.24 2.63 3.70 8.29 2.02 1.00 1.26 1.02 1.01 1.04 3.05 0.45 1.38 1.52 0.24
SE IS 0.13 4.52 1.20 1.00 0.77 0.59 0.51 0.39 0.51 0.17 1.00 0.92 1.02 1.01 0.93 2.90 0.44 1.37 1.76 0.36
SE Un 0.00 5.52 1.33 1.00 1.28 1.52 1.13 2.17 2.30 0.52 1.00 1.16 1.08 1.01 1.09 2.49 0.29 1.47 1.38 0.63
SE OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SE Cm 0.00 6.84 1.25 1.00 0.72 0.85 1.03 0.94 0.89 0.75 1.00 1.23 1.01 1.00 1.25 2.99 0.73 1.63 1.52 0.50
SE UP 1.38 1.82 0.98 1.00 1.13 1.16 1.30 0.73 2.43 0.84 1.00 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.48 0.45 1.13 1.26 0.23 0.30
MultiLogit output of relative risk ratios (1991-1994)
FS IS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FS Un 0.12 1.27 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.34 2.47 2.43 NA 1.70 NA 0.66 1.04 0.99 1.30 1.18 0.94 1.51 0.39 0.58
FS OLF 15.03 0.36 0.82 1.00 1.14 1.39 1.76 2.32 NA 1.66 NA 0.84 0.90 1.01 0.98 0.61 3.03 0.90 0.60 0.60
FS SE 0.00 2.42 1.23 1.00 0.75 1.16 1.86 1.50 NA 2.33 NA 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.85 1.78 0.99 0.79 0.69 1.38
FS Cm 0.02 2.24 1.11 1.00 1.09 1.37 1.75 1.57 NA 0.96 NA 1.24 0.99 1.00 0.93 1.33 0.81 0.86 0.37 0.94
FS UP 0.22 0.77 1.05 1.00 1.12 1.06 1.66 1.72 NA 1.32 NA 1.54 0.95 0.99 1.07 0.12 0.22 0.55 0.61 0.61
IS FS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
IS Un 0.11 1.70 0.97 1.00 1.33 0.98 0.77 0.68 NA 0.74 NA 0.67 1.01 0.98 0.87 1.29 2.68 2.24 0.77 1.96
IS OLF 34.82 0.55 0.78 1.00 0.61 0.46 0.29 0.46 NA 0.48 NA 0.75 0.98 0.99 0.71 0.84 5.67 1.50 1.08 3.09
IS SE 0.01 3.23 1.09 1.00 0.88 0.60 0.40 0.52 NA 0.50 NA 1.90 0.99 1.00 0.47 1.27 2.65 1.53 0.94 4.52
IS Cm 0.03 4.48 1.01 1.00 1.87 1.32 0.88 0.65 NA 0.72 NA 1.24 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.35 1.90 1.74 0.67 3.05
IS UP 1.44 1.42 0.90 1.00 1.26 1.14 0.56 0.67 NA 0.79 NA 0.78 0.92 0.99 0.63 0.11 0.40 0.46 1.02 4.43
SE FS 0.01 7.26 1.24 1.00 1.27 1.63 2.84 2.07 NA 3.60 NA 1.48 0.99 1.00 1.36 2.11 0.23 0.93 1.76 0.25
SE IS 0.10 4.99 1.16 1.00 1.54 0.87 1.08 0.68 NA 0.95 NA 1.20 1.02 1.00 0.90 1.10 0.22 0.57 2.15 0.86
SE Un 0.00 6.56 1.11 1.00 0.93 0.88 1.21 0.80 NA 1.19 NA 0.82 1.07 1.01 1.35 1.06 0.21 0.90 1.54 18.42
SE OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SE Cm 0.01 15.82 1.12 1.00 0.75 0.78 1.07 1.29 NA 0.97 NA 1.58 1.04 1.01 1.21 1.14 0.45 0.56 1.18 1.62
SE UP 0.11 3.59 1.10 1.00 1.31 1.37 1.50 1.08 NA 1.40 NA 1.43 1.04 1.00 0.64 0.23 0.33 0.84 0.58 0.5439
Table 15
Relative Risk Ratios
Exiting FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR









High School 1.49 1.49 5.35 1.92
Secondary 1.18 1.86 4.77 2.52
Primary 1.14 1.16 4.13 1.65
Men 1.97 2.41 0.47 0.31
Contract 1.24 0.84 NA NA
The results of Table 14, restated in Table 15 for the particular case of how formal education
affects transition intensities, show that, relative to joining the informal sector, a worker exiting
the formal sector has self-employment as a more likely destination. In addition, the larger the
number of years in school spent by him/her, the less attractive the informal sector becomes.
These results also imply that, compared to what happened during 1991-1994, four years later
there is an increase in the odds that a worker without a high school education moves to the
informal sector.
  In the previous subsection we stressed the importance that secondary and high school
education have in reducing the hazard rates of leaving the formal sector and of increasing the
hazard rates of leaving the informal sector. We also pointed out that there was an increase in the
importance of secondary or high school education in reducing the odds of staying in the informal
sector; the importance was greater during the period 1995-1998, relative to 1991-1994.
 
  The results of Table 15 indicate a corresponding pattern with respect to workers exiting
the informal sector; for example, they reveal an important change across periods in the
relationship of workers with high school education ending up in the formal sector relative to
self-employment: during the period 1991-1994 the odds were 2 to 1, and in 1995-1998 they
increased to 5 to 1.
  3. Long Run Job Status Occupancy Probabilities
 
  In Subsection 1.3.2 we showed that in a population with only two possible job statuses,
employment and non-employment, the long run equilibrium proportions of these statuses (or state
occupancy probabilities) was determined by the hazard rate out of one job status relative to the
hazard rate out of the other one.
 
  By extending this argument to the case of more statuses, we can illustrate the way in which
the analysis of Subsection 1.3.1 enables us to consider labor market dynamics in Mexico in terms
of a continuous semi-Markov process.  At the end of this section we present an example of how
these results can be obtained by means of the hazard and transition intensities functions estimated
in this research.
 
  When we consider the extension of the 2x2 case presented in Subsection 1.3.2 to determine
the long run equilibrium proportions or state occupancy probabilities, we obtain, for the kxk case,
 40
  instead of a system such as that given by (3) in that subsection, a differential equations system
which is now given by:
 





       (13)
where the elements of  Pk(t)  give the probabilities with which each of the k states will be
occupied at time t by a person who began at t=0 in state k. The elements of the matrix Q now
include hazard rates and transition intensities.
41  Since the number of states is finite and the
transition intensities are such that it is possible to get from any state to any other, there exists a
unique row vector of probabilities, Pk, satisfying:
PkQ = 0        (14)
which, enables us to deduce that the long-run state occupancy probabilities (or long-run
equilibrium proportions) for the three job statuses case, are given by the following equations:
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and hi is the hazard rate of leaving state i and hij the transition intensity of leaving state i with
destination j.
By means of the hazard and the transition intensity functions estimated in the previous
subsections, we can estimate long run equilibrium proportions or probabilities for groups of
different characteristics in Mexico. In turn, dividing the estimated probabilities for two job
statuses, enable us to obtain the odds of finding a worker with given characteristics in one status
relative to the other one.
  An alternative procedure for estimating these equilibrium state occupancy probabilities is
by means of the transition probabilities given by (11) and by the calculation of the average length
of time spent in each job status. With this alternative procedure it becomes more explicit that
workers move through a sequence of statuses, e.g., he/she might start being an unpaid worker and
move to the informal sector before entering the formal sector or, once in the formal sector, a
worker might move back to the informal sector only to return to the formal sector after a period of
unemployment.
 
  Formally, the procedure is as follows: let  ij p  be the transition probability, as stated by
equation (11) defined above, for  j i „ and zero otherwise, and determine a fixed point of the
transition probabilities matrix, that is  P ￿ =p p , and define the equilibrium state occupancy
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probabilities satisfying  ￿ =
i i 1 p .  For example, in the 3  states case, the equilibrium state
occupancy probabilities are obtained by solving:
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In turn, it can be shown that estimating the long run state occupancy probabilities by means of









where Pi is the long run state occupancy probability of state i and mi is the average length of time
spent in each state once it is entered.
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  With equation (17) we can calculate long run equilibrium proportions or probabilities for
groups of different characteristics in Mexico by means of the results related to the average length
of time spent in each job status (estimated with the Weibull hazard rate) and with the multinomial
logit estimations (which enable us to calculate the transition probabilities required to obtain the
values of the equilibrium state occupancy probabilities in (16), when it is assumed that, given that
departure occurs at t, the probability that it is to state k does not depend upon t).
In Table 16 we present the long run state occupancy probabilities calculated for workers
with different characteristics for the period of 1995-1998 and in Table 32, relegated to the
Appendix, we present corresponding results for 1991-1994.
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Woman, Age=30, Spouse (2nd salary), High School, 2 jobs in life and 5 years of work experience,
written contract, course training
FS IS Un OLF SE Com UP
FS 0 0.22 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.24 23.80 0.58
IS 0.53 0 0.01 0.39 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 6.88 0.08
Un 0.27 0.06 0 0.57 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.14 1.71 0.02
OLF 0.36 0.10 0.29 0 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.34 6.42 0.22
SE 0.03 0.00 0.66 0.00 0 0.28 0 0.05 7.07 0.04
Com 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.67 0.10 0 0.02 0.05 4.33 0.02
UP 0.04 0.31 0.00 0.51 0.05 0.06 0 0.04 2.83 0.01
Man, Age=45, Breadwinner, High School, 5 jobs in life and 25 years of work experience, written
contract, course training
FS IS Un OLF SE Com UP
FS 0 0.28 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.32 58.34 0.57
IS 0.81 0 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.12 19.50 0.07
Un 0.25 0.15 0 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.82 0.00
OLF 0.27 0.08 0.42 0 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.03 2.06 0.00
SE 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.07 0 0.31 0.00 0.16 43.26 0.20
Com 0.68 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.21 0 0.00 0.29 16.98 0.15
UP 0.18 0.29 0.05 0.15 0.26 0.05 0 0.00 3.23 0.00
* Probability of entering state j given that the state i was left.
** Long run probability that the state j is entered at any transition.
*** Average length of time spent in each state, once it is entered (calculated with Weibull model).
**** Probability of the process being in each of the seven states at an arbitrary time remote from the
origin (do not depend upon which state was occupied at time 0).
 
  The long-run equilibrium state occupancy probability in the formal sector, estimated for a
man 45 years old with the characteristics stated in Table 16, was 0.57 for the sample period 1995-
1998. This result can be compared with the corresponding figure for the estimated models with the
sample period 1991-1994, (which was 0.62, as shown in the Table 32 of the Appendix). With
comparisons like this, we can identify those groups in the urban labor force that became less likely
to stay long in the formal sector due to structural and institutional changes occurring after 1994 in
the Mexican economy. In the case of these kinds of workers, the odds of being found in a job
status in which one is paid by commission, relative to the formal sector, more than double in four
years.
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third of corresponding value in Table 16.43
 
  With the results obtained in the previous section, we can also assess how the characteristics
linked to groups of workers determine long run changes in job status probabilities. Characteristics
that can be thus assessed include those related to the enforcement of labor regulations (e.g., having
a written contract to work for an indefinite period or working in a small firm), to the worker’s
potential productivity (e.g,. years of formal education, number and kind of training courses taken)
or to his/her personal situation (e.g., bread-winner, age, sex , etc.).
 
  With assessments like this we move in the direction of answering whether the increasing
share of workers in the informal sector and of self-employed people is evidence of market
segmentation or is instead consistent with a well-integrated market, where workers search across
sectors for job opportunities.
 
  Conclusions
In this study we have pointed out a number of features indicating a high frequency of job
changes by workers during the 1990s in Mexico, among them:
a) that the time spent in a job and the so-called four and six-year retention rates are short relative
to OECD countries; b) that between 15% and 20% of wage earners in the formal sector move out
to another job status in only one quarter, and that the figures for other job status (informal
workers, self-employment, unpaid jobs, etc.) are much higher; and c) that the shares that each job
status represented within the total population did not vary significantly, in spite of substantial
movements of persons among job statuses. This last feature implies that the spaces left by the
flow of persons out of one job status and into another one are to a great extent filled by a flow of
persons moving in the opposite direction.
One of the questions that these indicators lead to is whether there are institutional or
structural features suggesting that successful and productive job matches end sooner than
otherwise be optimal in Mexico. In turn, the high frequency of job changes by workers indicates,
relative to a situation with a lower frequency, a faster speed of creation of vacancies. This
implies not only that individuals looking for another job and unemployed people searching for a
job are more likely to find one, but also that they might do so in a shorter period of time.  Hence,
these features also lead to another question, namely: Is the high frequency of changes among job
statuses that characterizes the urban market a reflection of problems that demand policy
intervention, or do these changes only grease the wheels of the labor market?
We estimated hazard functions for two periods, 1991-1994 and 1991-1998, for employees
in the formal sector and compared them with corresponding functions for other job statuses in
the urban labor force. Among other determinants of interest, we measured the extent to which
hazard rates out of the formal sector are reduced for workers with education above elementary
school. The results pointed out important reductions in the hazard rates of leaving the formal
sector for employees with secondary, high school and technical formation, relative to hazard
rates for uneducated workers.
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  Our study also showed that the opposite effect is registered in the cases of employees in
the informal sector and in self-employment: persons with formal education spend less time in
these job statuses, compared to workers without it. Moreover, we showed that during the period
1995-1998 having secondary or high school education was more important—relative to what
happened four years earlier—to reduce the odds of staying in the informal sector. With these
hazard functions we calculated median time spent by workers in the formal sector relative to the
median time spent by those in the informal sector. They indicated that median time spent in the
formal sector is more than 3.5 times that in the informal sector during 1995-1998 and less than
3.25 for 1991-1994.
  We also found that taking a training course would have helped a worker leave the informal
sector during the period 1991-1994, but not during the period 1995-1998. In contrast, having
received a training course within a period smaller than fifteen months reduces the hazard of
leaving the formal sector in both periods.
Although Mexican labor legislation has undergone no explicit modification for decades,
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the relative strength of its enforcement has been changing along with commercial and other
structural reforms. Among the regulations whose less strict enforcement could be reducing job
stability in the formal sector is the one related to having written contracts to work for an
indefinite period or for a period longer than six months.
  We measured the extent to which this kind of contract reduces the risk of moving out of
the formal sector. We showed that it is quite important. The estimates also indicate that working
in a firm with fewer than 15 workers increases the hazard rates of not staying in a job in the formal
sector. This result might be associated with the fact that, in Mexico, the enforcement of labor
regulations differs across industries and firms, with smaller firms being more difficult to
monitor. Hence job dismissals in small firms might be more expeditious. This hypothesis can be
reinforced by the fact that a minimum of 20 workers is required to constitute a trade union.
We also extended our analysis to assess the likely destination of workers with different
characteristics when they exit a job status. We discussed a number of results, for example, that it
is possible to state that if a worker that has a written contract to work exits the formal sector,
he/she is 25% more probable to have the self-employment, relative to the informal sector, as a
destination. Since dismissed workers with written contracts are those likely to receive severance
payments and seniority premiums, these results suggest that, in view of credit market
imperfections, dismissals makes initiating a self-employed job easier.
  With the transition intensities functions implied by these results and the hazard rate
functions, we calculated long-run equilibrium proportions or probabilities for groups of different
characteristics in Mexico. We have attempted to show that this procedure may contribute to
determining answering if the increasing share of workers in the informal sector and of self-
employed people is evidence of market segmentation or if it is consistent with a well-integrated
market where workers search across sectors for job opportunities.
                                                       
44Cfr. Dávila (1994) and OECD (1998).45
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Appendix
Table 17
Initial Sample for each ENEU Panel Structure
II-91 II-93 II-94 II-95 II-96 II-97
FS 28,847 23.0% 53,140 22.5% 53,825 22.0% 52,488 20.7% 54,169 20.4% 59,080 21.7%
IS 13,671 10.9% 27,020 11.4% 28,013 11.4% 28,573 11.3% 32,825 12.4% 34,472 12.6%
Un 1,463 1.2% 4,295 1.8% 4,732 1.9% 8,537 3.4% 7,308 2.8% 5,345 2.0%
OLF 61,076 48.6% 107,881 45.6% 113,421 46.3% 115,190 45.4% 119,227 45.0% 119,894 44.0%
SE 14,132 11.2% 28,389 12.0% 29,119 11.9% 31,774 12.5% 33,441 12.6% 35,101 12.9%
Comm 4,009 3.2% 8,612 3.6% 9,253 3.8% 9,740 3.8% 10,294 3.9% 10,692 3.9%
UnP 2,482 2.0% 6,409 2.7% 6,859 2.8% 7,666 3.0% 7,848 3.0% 8,083 3.0%
Total 125,680 100% 235,746 100% 245,222 100% 253,968 100% 265,112 100% 272,668 100%
Number of obsevations are without factor of expansion.
Table 18
ENEU 1991, quarterly linked panel structure
II-91 to III-91 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 16,167 1,853 258 1,101 671 444 59 20,553 78.7% 9.0% 1.3% 5.4% 3.3% 2.2% 0.3% 100%
IS 1,976 4,774 195 1,254 835 420 192 9,646 20.5% 49.5% 2.0% 13.0% 8.7% 4.4% 2.0% 100%
Un 200 181 154 340 99 46 15 1,035 19.3% 17.5% 14.9% 32.9% 9.6% 4.4% 1.4% 100%
OLF 1,153 1,669 540 38,375 1,215 309 885 44,146 2.6% 3.8% 1.2% 86.9% 2.8% 0.7% 2.0% 100%
SE 638 833 115 1,127 6,991 384 164 10,252 6.2% 8.1% 1.1% 11.0% 68.2% 3.7% 1.6% 100%
Comm 479 427 52 277 387 1,217 31 2,870 16.7% 14.9% 1.8% 9.7% 13.5% 42.4% 1.1% 100%
UnP 72 196 14 673 150 23 721 1,849 3.9% 10.6% 0.8% 36.4% 8.1% 1.2% 39.0% 100%
Total 20,685 9,933 1,328 43,147 10,348 2,843 2,067 90,351 22.9% 11.0% 1.5% 47.8% 11.5% 3.1% 2.3% 100%
III-91 to IV-91 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 9,533 720 98 381 223 180 19 11,154 85.5% 6.5% 0.9% 3.4% 2.0% 1.6% 0.2% 100%
IS 483 2,054 45 294 204 119 49 3,248 14.9% 63.2% 1.4% 9.1% 6.3% 3.7% 1.5% 100%
Total 10,016 2,774 143 675 427 299 68 14,402 69.5% 19.3% 1.0% 4.7% 3.0% 2.1% 0.5% 100%49
Table 19
ENEU 1993, quarterly linked panel structure
II-93 to III-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 30,141 3,286 558 1,637 896 866 150 37,534 80.3% 8.8% 1.5% 4.4% 2.4% 2.3% 0.4% 100%
IS 3,611 9,394 550 2,299 1,502 881 392 18,629 19.4% 50.4% 3.0% 12.3% 8.1% 4.7% 2.1% 100%
Un 443 531 600 1,026 237 142 66 3,045 14.5% 17.4% 19.7% 33.7% 7.8% 4.7% 2.2% 100%
OLF 1,515 2,824 1,396 66,328 2,311 694 1,817 76,885 2.0% 3.7% 1.8% 86.3% 3.0% 0.9% 2.4% 100%
SE 915 1,472 271 2,320 14,035 774 415 20,202 4.5% 7.3% 1.3% 11.5% 69.5% 3.8% 2.1% 100%
Comm 830 898 131 629 755 2,766 83 6,092 13.6% 14.7% 2.2% 10.3% 12.4% 45.4% 1.4% 100%
UnP 136 425 75 1,506 446 106 2,037 4,731 2.9% 9.0% 1.6% 31.8% 9.4% 2.2% 43.1% 100%
Total 37,591 18,830 3,581 75,745 20,182 6,229 4,960 167,118 22.5% 11.3% 2.1% 45.3% 12.1% 3.7% 3.0% 100%
III-93 to IV-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 18,608 1,274 199 646 334 305 31 21,397 87.0% 6.0% 0.9% 3.0% 1.6% 1.4% 0.1% 100%
IS 852 4,265 137 538 337 243 77 6,449 13.2% 66.1% 2.1% 8.3% 5.2% 3.8% 1.2% 100%
Total 19,460 5,539 336 1,184 671 548 108 27,846 69.9% 19.9% 1.2% 4.3% 2.4% 2.0% 0.4% 100%
Table 20
ENEU 1994, quarterly linked panel structure
II-94 to III-94 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 30,852 3,015 580 1,458 1,018 918 130 37,971 81.3% 7.9% 1.5% 3.8% 2.7% 2.4% 0.3% 100%
IS 3,474 9,776 606 2,368 1,462 983 374 19,043 18.2% 51.3% 3.2% 12.4% 7.7% 5.2% 2.0% 100%
Un 549 575 687 1,017 309 155 64 3,356 16.4% 17.1% 20.5% 30.3% 9.2% 4.6% 1.9% 100%
OLF 1,613 2,897 1,549 69,243 2,402 782 1,943 80,429 2.0% 3.6% 1.9% 86.1% 3.0% 1.0% 2.4% 100%
SE 922 1,483 301 2,271 14,535 802 403 20,717 4.5% 7.2% 1.5% 11.0% 70.2% 3.9% 1.9% 100%
Comm 833 945 158 643 908 2,834 81 6,402 13.0% 14.8% 2.5% 10.0% 14.2% 44.3% 1.3% 100%
UnP 127 456 88 1,636 442 81 2,087 4,917 2.6% 9.3% 1.8% 33.3% 9.0% 1.6% 42.4% 100%
Total 38,370 19,147 3,969 78,636 21,076 6,555 5,082 172,835 22.2% 11.1% 2.3% 45.5% 12.2% 3.8% 2.9% 100%
III-94 to IV-94 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 18,746 998 205 578 360 309 28 21,224 88.3% 4.7% 1.0% 2.7% 1.7% 1.5% 0.1% 100%
IS 806 4,542 133 495 351 234 74 6,635 12.1% 68.5% 2.0% 7.5% 5.3% 3.5% 1.1% 100%
Total 19,552 5,540 338 1,073 711 543 102 27,859 70.2% 19.9% 1.2% 3.9% 2.6% 1.9% 0.4% 100%50
Table 21
ENEU 1995, quarterly linked panel structure
II-95 to III-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 29,673 3,070 840 1,203 907 834 112 36,639 81.0% 8.4% 2.3% 3.3% 2.5% 2.3% 0.3% 100%
IS 2,780 10,359 1,010 2,342 1,675 1,027 403 19,596 14.2% 52.9% 5.2% 12.0% 8.5% 5.2% 2.1% 100%
Un 604 1,109 1,682 1,523 637 300 140 5,995 10.1% 18.5% 28.1% 25.4% 10.6% 5.0% 2.3% 100%
OLF 1,173 2,923 2,171 69,633 2,735 788 2,225 81,648 1.4% 3.6% 2.7% 85.3% 3.3% 1.0% 2.7% 100%
SE 798 1,692 620 2,470 15,500 918 496 22,494 3.5% 7.5% 2.8% 11.0% 68.9% 4.1% 2.2% 100%
Comm 774 931 315 680 851 3,196 108 6,855 11.3% 13.6% 4.6% 9.9% 12.4% 46.6% 1.6% 100%
UnP 103 444 143 1,779 519 107 2,403 5,498 1.9% 8.1% 2.6% 32.4% 9.4% 1.9% 43.7% 100%
Total 35,905 20,528 6,781 79,630 22,824 7,170 5,887 178,725 20.1% 11.5% 3.8% 44.6% 12.8% 4.0% 3.3% 100%
III-95 to IV-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 18,230 1,141 231 385 228 261 18 20,494 89.0% 5.6% 1.1% 1.9% 1.1% 1.3% 0.1% 100%
IS 725 4,788 174 474 388 261 79 6,889 10.5% 69.5% 2.5% 6.9% 5.6% 3.8% 1.1% 100%
Total 18,955 5,929 405 859 616 522 97 27,383 69.2% 21.7% 1.5% 3.1% 2.2% 1.9% 0.4% 100%
Table 22
ENEU 1996, quarterly linked panel structure
II-96 to III-96 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 32,000 2,979 620 1,322 983 849 99 38,852 82.4% 7.7% 1.6% 3.4% 2.5% 2.2% 0.3% 100%
IS 3,484 12,604 734 2,714 2,002 1,037 463 23,038 15.1% 54.7% 3.2% 11.8% 8.7% 4.5% 2.0% 100%
Un 669 925 1,137 1,495 537 246 85 5,094 13.1% 18.2% 22.3% 29.3% 10.5% 4.8% 1.7% 100%
OLF 1,358 3,113 1,670 74,597 2,761 784 2,152 86,435 1.6% 3.6% 1.9% 86.3% 3.2% 0.9% 2.5% 100%
SE 951 1,718 409 2,798 17,107 918 529 24,430 3.9% 7.0% 1.7% 11.5% 70.0% 3.8% 2.2% 100%
Comm 908 1,059 195 720 947 3,485 90 7,404 12.3% 14.3% 2.6% 9.7% 12.8% 47.1% 1.2% 100%
UnP 160 486 79 1,930 546 106 2,539 5,846 2.7% 8.3% 1.4% 33.0% 9.3% 1.8% 43.4% 100%
Total 39,530 22,884 4,844 85,576 24,883 7,425 5,957 191,099 20.7% 12.0% 2.5% 44.8% 13.0% 3.9% 3.1% 100%
III-96 to IV-96 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 19,848 939 214 482 227 274 26 22,010 90.2% 4.3% 1.0% 2.2% 1.0% 1.2% 0.1% 100%
IS 968 5,979 178 520 409 291 88 8,433 11.5% 70.9% 2.1% 6.2% 4.8% 3.5% 1.0% 100%
Total 20,816 6,918 392 1,002 636 565 114 30,443 68.4% 22.7% 1.3% 3.3% 2.1% 1.9% 0.4% 100%51
Table 23
ENEU 1997, quarterly linked panel structure
II-97 to III-97 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 34,800 3,113 563 1,483 989 877 113 41,938 83.0% 7.4% 1.3% 3.5% 2.4% 2.1% 0.3% 100%
IS 3,729 13,123 614 2,982 1,871 1,070 463 23,852 15.6% 55.0% 2.6% 12.5% 7.8% 4.5% 1.9% 100%
Un 582 726 649 1,184 326 142 77 3,686 15.8% 19.7% 17.6% 32.1% 8.8% 3.9% 2.1% 100%
OLF 1,581 3,378 1,364 73,345 2,747 801 2,076 85,293 1.9% 4.0% 1.6% 86.0% 3.2% 0.9% 2.4% 100%
SE 1,055 1,938 264 2,764 17,536 926 556 25,039 4.2% 7.7% 1.1% 11.0% 70.0% 3.7% 2.2% 100%
Comm 1,018 1,178 136 750 951 3,466 81 7,580 13.4% 15.5% 1.8% 9.9% 12.5% 45.7% 1.1% 100%
UnP 137 548 78 1,873 563 105 2,443 5,747 2.4% 9.5% 1.4% 32.6% 9.8% 1.8% 42.5% 100%
Total 42,902 24,004 3,668 84,381 24,983 7,387 5,809 193,135 22.2% 12.4% 1.9% 43.7% 12.9% 3.8% 3.0% 100%
III-97 to IV-97 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 21,929 978 194 511 275 310 35 24,232 90.5% 4.0% 0.8% 2.1% 1.1% 1.3% 0.1% 100%
IS 1,030 6,208 186 643 441 268 81 8,857 11.6% 70.1% 2.1% 7.3% 5.0% 3.0% 0.9% 100%
Total 22,959 7,186 380 1,154 716 578 116 33,089 69.4% 21.7% 1.1% 3.5% 2.2% 1.7% 0.4% 100%52
Table 24
ENE-ENECE-ENEU match 1991, quarterly linked panel structure
II-91 to III-91 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 16,156 1,850 257 1,089 661 443 692 21,148 76.4% 8.7% 1.2% 5.1% 3.1% 2.1% 3.3% 100%
IS 1,974 4,771 197 1,251 832 420 601 10,046 19.6% 47.5% 2.0% 12.5% 8.3% 4.2% 6.0% 100%
Un 200 180 155 339 99 47 64 1,084 18.5% 16.6% 14.3% 31.3% 9.1% 4.3% 5.9% 100%
OLF 1,144 1,661 550 37,844 1,203 305 1,851 44,558 2.6% 3.7% 1.2% 84.9% 2.7% 0.7% 4.2% 100%
SE 628 830 115 1,107 6,975 381 381 10,417 6.0% 8.0% 1.1% 10.6% 67.0% 3.7% 3.7% 100%
Comm 479 426 52 273 384 1,216 118 2,948 16.2% 14.5% 1.8% 9.3% 13.0% 41.2% 4.0% 100%
UnP 84 206 15 768 162 28 1,055 2,318 3.6% 8.9% 0.6% 33.1% 7.0% 1.2% 45.5% 100%
Total 20,665 9,924 1,341 42,671 10,316 2,840 4,762 92,519 22.3% 10.7% 1.4% 46.1% 11.2% 3.1% 5.1% 100%
III-91 to IV-
91
FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 9,534 720 92 277 218 180 424 11,445 83.3% 6.3% 0.8% 2.4% 1.9% 1.6% 3.7% 100%
IS 484 2,054 41 153 204 119 336 3,391 14.3% 60.6% 1.2% 4.5% 6.0% 3.5% 9.9% 100%
Total 10,018 2,774 133 430 422 299 760 14,836 67.5% 18.7% 0.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.0% 5.1% 100%
IV-91 to I-92 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 5,308 255 43 120 69 71 188 6,054 87.7% 4.2% 0.7% 2.0% 1.1% 1.2% 3.1% 100%
IS 153 928 19 45 60 35 78 1,318 11.6% 70.4% 1.4% 3.4% 4.6% 2.7% 5.9% 100%
Total 5,461 1,183 62 165 129 106 266 7,372 74.1% 16.0% 0.8% 2.2% 1.7% 1.4% 3.6% 100%
I-92 to II-92 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 2,250 108 16 39 19 28 59 2,519 89.3% 4.3% 0.6% 1.5% 0.8% 1.1% 2.3% 100%
IS 47 340 4 13 13 5 21 443 10.6% 76.7% 0.9% 2.9% 2.9% 1.1% 4.7% 100%
Total 2,297 448 20 52 32 33 80 2,962 77.5% 15.1% 0.7% 1.8% 1.1% 1.1% 2.7% 100%53
Table 25
ENE-ENECE-ENEU Match 1993, quarterly linked panel structure
II-93 to III-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 16,129 1,836 344 937 513 531 97 20,367 79.2% 9.0% 1.7% 4.6% 2.5% 2.6% 0.5% 100%
IS 1,978 4,852 280 1,183 836 403 222 9,754 20.3% 49.7% 2.9% 12.1% 8.6% 4.1% 2.3% 100%
Un 238 280 318 520 139 60 30 1,585 15.0% 17.7% 20.1% 32.8% 8.8% 3.8% 1.9% 100%
OLF 823 1,440 666 34,790 1,155 336 982 40,194 2.0% 3.6% 1.7% 86.6% 2.9% 0.8% 2.4% 100%
SE 529 815 137 1,215 7,422 371 236 10,725 4.9% 7.6% 1.3% 11.3% 69.2% 3.5% 2.2% 100%
Comm 468 463 69 310 372 1,493 47 3,220 14.5% 14.4% 2.1% 9.6% 11.6% 46.4% 1.5% 100%
UnP 85 217 32 796 239 41 1,300 2,710 3.1% 8.0% 1.2% 29.4% 8.8% 1.5% 48.0% 100%
Total 20,250 9,903 1,846 39,731 10,676 3,233 2,934 88,553 22.9% 11.2% 2.1% 44.9% 12.1% 3.7% 3.3% 100%
III-93 to IV-93 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 9,631 670 116 335 164 178 14 11,108 86.7% 6.0% 1.0% 3.0% 1.5% 1.6% 0.1% 100%
IS 470 2,126 54 267 187 123 35 3,262 14.4% 65.2% 1.7% 8.2% 5.7% 3.8% 1.1% 100%
Total 10,101 2,796 170 602 351 301 49 14,370 70.3% 19.5% 1.2% 4.2% 2.4% 2.1% 0.3% 100%
IV-93 to I-94 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 5,322 264 59 134 46 79 6 5,930 89.7% 4.5% 1.0% 2.3% 0.8% 1.3% 0.1% 100%
IS 125 961 24 80 36 28 11 1,265 9.9% 76.0% 1.9% 6.3% 2.8% 2.2% 0.9% 100%
Total 5,447 1,225 83 214 82 107 17 7,175 75.9% 17.1% 1.2% 3.0% 1.1% 1.5% 0.2% 100%
I-94 to II-94 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 2,262 89 28 43 19 22 5 2,468 91.7% 3.6% 1.1% 1.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.2% 100%
IS 41 378 8 22 9 8 3 469 8.7% 80.6% 1.7% 4.7% 1.9% 1.7% 0.6% 100%
Total 2,303 467 36 65 28 30 8 2,937 78.4% 15.9% 1.2% 2.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.3% 100%54
Table 26
ENE-ENECE-ENEU Match 1995, quarterly linked panel structure
II-95 to III-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 10,723 1,148 309 492 369 349 44 13,434 79.8% 8.5% 2.3% 3.7% 2.7% 2.6% 0.3% 100%
IS 1,029 3,673 334 879 592 344 158 7,009 14.7% 52.4% 4.8% 12.5% 8.4% 4.9% 2.3% 100%
Un 241 441 631 541 241 108 40 2,243 10.7% 19.7% 28.1% 24.1% 10.7% 4.8% 1.8% 100%
OLF 449 1,004 757 24,679 953 243 700 28,785 1.6% 3.5% 2.6% 85.7% 3.3% 0.8% 2.4% 100%
SE 326 666 210 910 5,581 316 160 8,169 4.0% 8.2% 2.6% 11.1% 68.3% 3.9% 2.0% 100%
Comm 293 304 108 229 277 1,127 37 2,375 12.3% 12.8% 4.5% 9.6% 11.7% 47.5% 1.6% 100%
UnP 28 181 52 610 168 36 770 1,845 1.5% 9.8% 2.8% 33.1% 9.1% 2.0% 41.7% 100%
Total 13,089 7,417 2,401 28,340 8,181 2,523 1,909 63,860 20.5% 11.6% 3.8% 44.4% 12.8% 4.0% 3.0% 100%
III-95 to IV-95 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 6,623 355 78 169 86 100 5 7,416 89.3% 4.8% 1.1% 2.3% 1.2% 1.3% 0.1% 100%
IS 265 1,756 52 174 129 98 22 2,496 10.6% 70.4% 2.1% 7.0% 5.2% 3.9% 0.9% 100%
Total 6,888 2,111 130 343 215 198 27 9,912 69.5% 21.3% 1.3% 3.5% 2.2% 2.0% 0.3% 100%
IV-95 to I-96 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 3,728 130 43 75 26 48 3 4,053 92.0% 3.2% 1.1% 1.9% 0.6% 1.2% 0.1% 100%
IS 86 819 27 64 37 28 6 1,067 8.1% 76.8% 2.5% 6.0% 3.5% 2.6% 0.6% 100%
Total 3,814 949 70 139 63 76 9 5,120 74.5% 18.5% 1.4% 2.7% 1.2% 1.5% 0.2% 100%
I-96 to II-96 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 1,641 57 15 45 19 18 0 1,795 91.4% 3.2% 0.8% 2.5% 1.1% 1.0% 0.0% 100%
IS 36 300 10 26 15 3 3 393 9.2% 76.3% 2.5% 6.6% 3.8% 0.8% 0.8% 100%
Total 1,677 357 25 71 34 21 3 2,188 76.6% 16.3% 1.1% 3.2% 1.6% 1.0% 0.1% 100%55
Table 27
ENE-ENECE-ENEU Match 1997, quarterly linked panel structure
II-97 to III-
97
FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 10,342 952 161 453 296 285 30 12,519 82.6% 7.6% 1.3% 3.6% 2.4% 2.3% 0.2% 100%
IS 1,122 3,638 159 716 561 297 106 6,599 17.0% 55.1% 2.4% 10.9% 8.5% 4.5% 1.6% 100%
Un 167 181 156 319 77 34 18 952 17.5% 19.0% 16.4% 33.5% 8.1% 3.6% 1.9% 100%
OLF 493 746 349 14,165 613 163 387 16,916 2.9% 4.4% 2.1% 83.7% 3.6% 1.0% 2.3% 100%
SE 328 567 69 737 4,860 301 152 7,014 4.7% 8.1% 1.0% 10.5% 69.3% 4.3% 2.2% 100%
Comm 327 301 35 182 271 954 22 2,092 15.6% 14.4% 1.7% 8.7% 13.0% 45.6% 1.1% 100%
UnP 35 120 15 365 150 26 544 1,255 2.8% 9.6% 1.2% 29.1% 12.0% 2.1% 43.3% 100%
Total 12,814 6,505 944 16,937 6,828 2,060 1,259 47,347 27.1% 13.7% 2.0% 35.8% 14.4% 4.4% 2.7% 100%
III-97 to IV-
97
FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 6,490 308 49 154 91 104 13 7,209 90.0% 4.3% 0.7% 2.1% 1.3% 1.4% 0.2% 100%
IS 326 1,688 46 166 125 88 29 2,468 13.2% 68.4% 1.9% 6.7% 5.1% 3.6% 1.2% 100%
Total 6,816 1,996 95 320 216 192 42 9,677 70.4% 20.6% 1.0% 3.3% 2.2% 2.0% 0.4% 100%
IV-97 to I-98 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 3,642 124 33 164 40 54 3 4,060 89.7% 3.1% 0.8% 4.0% 1.0% 1.3% 0.1% 100%
IS 100 754 21 89 36 27 4 1,031 9.7% 73.1% 2.0% 8.6% 3.5% 2.6% 0.4% 100%
Total 3,742 878 54 253 76 81 7 5,091 73.5% 17.2% 1.1% 5.0% 1.5% 1.6% 0.1% 100%
I-98 to II-98 FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total FS IS Un OLF SE Comm UnP Total
FS 1,573 45 9 76 22 13 1 1,739 90.5% 2.6% 0.5% 4.4% 1.3% 0.7% 0.1% 100%
IS 33 235 24 15 6 6 319 10.3% 73.7% 0.0% 7.5% 4.7% 1.9% 1.9% 100%
Total 1,606 280 9 100 37 19 7 2,058 78.0% 13.6% 0.4% 4.9% 1.8% 0.9% 0.3% 100%56
Table 28. Distribution of Workers among Sectors (ENEU)
% of total workers
Quarter Formal salaried Informal salaried Self-Employed Commission Unpaid Total
I-87 49.85 20.33 19.83 6.09 3.9 100
II-87 46.74 22.92 20.71 5.73 3.9 100
III-87 47.13 23.08 20.01 5.74 4.04 100
IV-87 46.83 22.53 20.42 6.04 4.19 100
I-88 46.77 22.27 20.64 6.08 4.24 100
II-88 46.34 22.8 20.67 6.11 4.07 100
III-88 45.58 22.06 21.38 6.7 4.28 100
IV-88 45.17 22.51 21.2 6.61 4.5 100
I-89 45.69 22.83 21.11 6.32 4.05 100
II-89 45.73 22.25 21.68 6.23 4.11 100
III-89 44.73 23.21 22.19 5.96 3.91 100
IV-89 45.19 22.71 21.96 5.83 4.3 100
I-90 45.45 23.11 22.09 5.36 3.99 100
II-90 46.9 22.6 21.21 5.48 3.81 100
III-90 46.94 22.46 21.36 5.36 3.88 100
IV-90 47.28 22.35 20.74 5.69 3.94 100
I-91 48.1 21.66 20.6 5.96 3.68 100
II-91 47.93 21.48 20.8 6.18 3.6 100
III-91 46.21 22.24 20.96 6.65 3.95 100
IV-91 46 22.22 21.04 6.38 4.36 100
I-92 46.2 22.01 20.82 6.49 4.48 100
II-92 46.36 21.79 21.17 6.53 4.14 100
III-92 46.07 22.3 21.14 6.39 4.11 100
IV-92 46.03 22.23 21.35 6.39 4 100
I-93 46.17 21.33 21.36 6.88 4.26 100
II-93 45.37 21.99 21.24 7.07 4.33 100
III-93 44.99 22.03 21.45 7.01 4.51 100
IV-93 44.83 22 21.65 7.12 4.41 100
I-94 45.33 22.22 20.46 7.45 4.55 100
II-94 45.34 22.11 20.95 7.26 4.35 100
III-94 44.84 21.75 21.69 7.47 4.25 100
IV-94 45.08 21.68 21.38 7.49 4.36 100
I-95 45.18 21.26 21.63 7.4 4.53 100
II-95 43.89 21.69 22.33 7.54 4.55 100
III-95 41.92 22.83 22.77 7.6 4.89 100
IV-95 41.62 23.71 22.55 7.54 4.57 100
I-96 41.88 23.64 22.11 7.66 4.7 100
II-96 42.16 23.59 22.44 7.24 4.57 100
III-96 41.54 23.08 23.18 7.47 4.73 100
IV-96 41.56 23.92 22.57 7.2 4.76 100
I-97 41.74 23.83 22.43 7.31 4.7 100
II-97 42.16 23.52 22.67 7.04 4.61 100
III-97 42.52 23.73 22.45 7.09 4.21 100
IV-97 42.94 23.44 22.56 6.78 4.29 100
I-98 41.88 23.29 22.90 6.88 5.05 100
II-98 42.18 23.00 22.87 7.02 4.92 100
Source: ENEU I-87 to IV-97.57
Table 29
Hazard Functions
Urban labor market in Mexico
1991-1994 1995-1998
OLF Comm UnPaid OLF Comm UnPaid
Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val Coef P-Val
Constant 2.099 0.00 -0.115 0.00 -0.168 0.00 2.971 0.00 0.198 0.00 1.141 0.00
Man -0.464 0.00 0.356 0.00 0.218 0.00 -0.414 0.00 0.494 0.00 0.013 0.00
Age 0.079 0.00 0.141 0.00 0.121 0.00 0.069 0.00 0.113 0.00 0.108 0.00
Age ^2 -0.000 0.00 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 0.00 .0.00 0.00 -0.000 0.00 -0.001 0.00




0.342 0.00 -0.355 0.00 0.225 0.00 0.045 0.00 0.132 0.00 -0.088 0.00
Son -0.267 0.00 -0.024 0.00 0.629 0.00 -0.308 0.00 0.163 0.00 0.034 0.00
Elementary School
Inc.
0.009 0.00 0.211 0.00 0.222 0.00 -0.460 0.00 -0.053 0.00 -0.539 0.00
Elementary School
Comp.
0.034 0.00 0.119 0.00 0.109 0.00 -0.358 0.00 -0.071 0.00 -0.347 0.00
Secondary -0.074 0.00 0.119 0.00 0.129 0.00 -0.510 0.00 -0.152 0.00 -0.497 0.00
High School 0.317 0.00 0.013 0.02 0.084 0.00 -0.366 0.00 -0.284 0.00 -0.493 0.00
Technological F. NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.533 0.00 -0.664 0.00 -0.701 0.00
College & Higher 0.451 0.00 -0.201 0.00 -0.045 0.00 -0.057 0.00 -0.600 0.00 -0.257 0.00
Contract NA NA NA NA NA NA -1.263 0.00 0.335 0.00 NA NA
Married 0.419 0.00 -0.032 0.00 -0.019 0.00 0.392 0.00 -0.177 0.00 -0.092 0.00
Jobs in life -0.061 0.00 -0.061 0.00 -0.066 0.00 -0.058 0.00 -0.065 0.00 -0.117 0.00
Training course
last 2 years
-0.114 0.00 -0.003 0.31 -0.137 0.00 -0.175 0.00 0.105 0.00 -0.212 0.00
Work experience -0.052 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.018 0.00 -0.045 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.014 0.00
Services -0.651 0.00 -0.128 0.00 -0.005 0.15 -0.495 0.00 -0.133 0.00 -0.268 0.00
Micro -1.302 0.00 -0.070 0.00 0.004 0.00 -1.547 0.00 0.220 0.00 0.756 0.00
Alpha 0.957 0.00 1.042 0.00 1.055 0.00 1.001 0.00 0.995 0.00 1.161 0.00
Lambda 0.07 0.00 0.022 0.00 0.104 0.00 0.064 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Log likelihood -8997482.29 -1651112.74 -1093519.31 -9194582.96 -2020955.36 -1186563.79
Total observations 11,191,341 1,231,427 826,446 11,955,522 1,487,157 929,272
Censored data 8,151,407 351,781 238,509 8,851,142 458,469 258,364




Urban labor market (1991-1994)
Weibull Models Logistic Models
Survival Rates S(t) Hazard Rate
h(t)
Survival Rates S(t) Hazard Rate
h(t)
1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year 1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year
Woman, Age=30, Spouse (2nd aboard), High School, 2 jobs in life and 5 years of work experience, course training
Formal salaried 0.967 0.826 0.667 0.013 0.973 0.818 0.647 0.008
Informal salaried 0.846 0.454 0.215 0.036 0.922 0.59 0.368 0.025
Unemployed 0.486 0.013 0 0.242
OLF 0.906 0.631 0.409 0.02
Self employed 0.955 0.772 0.581 0.016 0.814 0.349 0.179 0.06
Comission 0.884 0.518 0.258 0.036
Unpaid 0.837 0.38 0.133 0.055
Man, Age=45, Breadwinner, High School, 5 jobs in life and 25 years of work experience,  course training.
Formal salaried 0.987 0.927 0.852 0.005 0.991 0.934 0.853 0.002
Informal salaried 0.913 0.652 0.434 0.019 0.996 0.973 0.936 0.001
Unemployed 0.57 0.034 0 0.192
OLF 0.883 0.559 0.323 0.025
Self employed 0.979 0.891 0.785 0.007 0.971 0.809 0.633 0.009
Comission 0.94 0.72 0.508 0.019
Unpaid 0.926 0.656 0.417 0.02559




















































































































































































































































Un FS 0.01 2.10 1.43 0.99 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.14 3.07 0.62 1.10 1.04 1.69 0.94 0.20 0.74 1.01 0.80
Un IS 0.11 2.34 1.22 1.00 0.63 0.29 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.07 1.49 0.75 1.11 1.01 1.51 1.37 0.26 1.01 0.88 1.75
Un OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Un SE 0.00 4.70 1.53 0.99 0.66 0.42 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.18 1.30 1.21 1.08 1.01 1.33 1.76 0.29 1.27 1.01 2.22
Un Cm 0.00 3.07 1.28 1.00 1.86 2.27 1.43 1.12 1.22 0.20 2.24 1.74 1.10 1.01 1.12 1.09 0.22 1.50 0.71 3.26
Un UP 0.00 6.43 1.26 1.00 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.33 0.16 2.32 0.36 1.09 1.00 0.42 33.50 40.14 17.7 1.44 0.75
OLF FS 0.03 0.83 1.06 1.00 3.78 6.08 9.63 10.45 19.57 12.62 3.11 1.09 0.97 1.02 1.31 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.85 0.86
OLF IS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
OLF Un 0.08 0.77 1.07 1.00 1.80 3.40 4.90 7.03 6.70 5.22 1.69 0.83 1.06 1.00 1.73 1.36 0.68 0.84 0.48 0.96
OLF SE 0.01 1.08 1.20 1.00 1.47 1.41 1.69 1.71 1.90 1.67 0.65 1.71 0.98 0.99 1.20 1.26 1.17 0.87 0.75 0.84
OLF Cm 0.01 2.34 1.10 1.00 3.72 3.10 3.42 3.58 1.87 3.15 0.93 1.39 1.00 0.98 1.35 1.02 2.62 1.00 0.55 1.21
OLF UP 0.25 0.99 0.94 1.00 2.11 3.09 3.18 4.46 3.58 4.28 0.65 1.19 0.85 0.99 0.92 0.38 2.52 1.50 0.32 0.71
Cm FS 0.08 0.83 1.13 1.00 2.14 3.18 2.60 2.40 2.91 3.92 3.74 1.50 0.99 0.99 2.50 0.50 0.24 0.62 0.33 0.35
Cm OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cm Un 2.42 0.88 0.90 1.00 1.19 0.90 1.20 0.65 2.51 2.56 0.36 1.03 1.03 1.01 3.05 0.47 0.83 0.97 0.41 0.79
Cm OLF 11.50 0.18 0.88 1.00 1.21 1.82 1.94 3.25 1.71 4.88 0.92 0.83 0.99 0.97 1.70 0.23 2.76 0.76 0.44 0.54
Cm SE 0.04 1.20 1.11 1.00 1.09 1.82 2.03 2.54 2.34 2.03 0.79 1.35 0.97 1.00 1.40 0.81 1.98 0.58 0.61 1.02
Cm UP 0.00 0.40 0.91 1.00 ## ## ### ### ### ### 0.83 0.58 0.91 0.98 1.99 0.12 5.18 1.99 0.83 1.14
UP FS 0.14 2.15 1.17 1.00 0.14 0.39 0.43 0.51 2.12 0.22 1.00 1.11 0.91 1.07 2.62 0.91 0.15 0.55 0.69 0.19
UP IS 0.04 4.30 1.23 1.00 1.40 1.02 0.95 0.79 1.69 0.44 1.00 0.81 1.10 0.98 2.22 0.21 0.23 0.78 0.81 0.40
UP Un 0.00 2.84 1.17 1.00 ### ### ### ### ### ### 1.00 0.34 1.03 1.10 2.31 1.10 0.34 0.35 0.53 2.13
UP OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
UP SE 0.00 4.08 1.29 1.00 0.77 0.92 1.17 0.42 1.17 0.22 1.00 2.07 1.02 1.01 1.60 0.75 0.59 1.53 0.32 2.38
UP Cm 0.00 8.78 1.05 1.00 5.24 13.0 7.71 3.09 9.74 2.77 1.00 7.28 1.15 0.97 1.56 3.25 3.44 8.88 3.10 0.20
MultiLogit Output of Relative Risk Ratios (1991-1994)
Un FS 0.01 1.91 1.25 1.00 0.55 0.95 1.59 1.85 NA 2.06 NA 1.40 1.10 1.03 1.04 2.17 0.20 1.16 1.79 0.54
Un IS 0.02 1.68 1.09 1.00 2.39 3.13 4.65 3.17 NA 4.54 NA 2.09 1.22 1.03 0.48 1.87 0.25 1.34 1.23 1.07
Un OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Un SE 0.00 3.23 1.47 0.99 0.98 0.87 0.80 1.24 NA 1.15 NA 1.22 1.07 1.01 0.65 7.54 2.16 2.92 1.82 1.77
Un Cm 0.00 4.20 1.42 0.99 7.66 7.90 6.56 7.33 NA 12.51 NA 1.40 1.09 1.02 0.89 2.64 0.34 1.69 1.86 2.05
Un UP 0.00 0.89 0.97 1.00 ## ## ### ### NA ### NA 1.05 0.98 0.99 0.25 6.56 0.84 0.72 0.86 1.54
OLF FS 0.03 0.76 1.08 1.00 2.84 5.68 8.08 7.26 NA 10.41 NA 1.12 1.03 1.02 0.75 1.07 0.98 1.14 1.05 0.50
OLF IS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
OLF Un 0.09 0.60 1.02 1.00 2.11 2.62 5.36 5.72 NA 5.93 NA 0.75 1.07 1.01 1.29 1.33 1.32 1.14 0.69 0.57
OLF SE 0.01 1.06 1.17 1.00 1.17 1.55 1.56 2.13 NA 2.05 NA 2.33 1.03 1.00 1.31 0.76 1.10 0.69 0.60 1.04
OLF Cm 0.03 1.26 1.07 1.00 0.98 1.49 1.75 1.61 NA 1.79 NA 2.44 1.06 1.01 1.14 0.66 1.30 1.01 0.54 1.16
OLF UP 0.66 0.81 0.99 1.00 1.22 1.28 1.40 1.71 NA 1.70 NA 2.08 0.89 0.99 0.93 0.24 0.53 0.70 0.36 0.79
Cm FS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cm OLF 1.37 1.20 0.94 1.00 1.08 0.75 0.92 0.63 NA 0.94 NA 0.81 1.04 1.00 0.65 0.90 2.60 1.20 1.79 3.77
Cm Un 0.06 1.86 1.05 1.00 0.45 0.60 0.74 0.33 NA 0.20 NA 0.46 1.01 0.97 1.06 0.95 10.93 1.62 1.21 2.51
Cm OLF 197.75 0.38 0.74 1.00 0.28 0.18 0.16 0.17 NA 0.29 NA 0.81 1.04 1.01 0.78 0.73 25.63 1.93 2.04 1.86
Cm SE 0.03 1.72 1.08 1.00 1.39 0.75 1.17 0.96 NA 1.50 NA 1.15 1.02 1.00 0.80 0.52 2.16 0.78 1.57 6.52
Cm UP 0.09 1.39 1.02 1.00 0.32 0.31 0.53 0.29 NA 0.38 NA 1.76 0.87 1.00 1.19 0.17 2.99 1.73 1.69 2.13
UP FS 0.00 2.66 1.32 1.00 3.00 8.42 14.84 13.04 NA 14.50 NA 0.43 1.09 1.02 0.67 2.88 0.38 0.71 0.99 0.48
UP IS 0.00 5.62 1.29 1.00 1.77 2.93 3.12 2.06 NA 0.49 NA 0.88 1.11 1.00 0.92 0.12 0.12 1.03 1.37 3.30
UP Un 0.00 4.19 1.64 0.99 ## ## ### ### NA ### NA 0.25 1.21 1.01 1.96 10.45 0.99 8.12 0.58 1.63
UP OLF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 NA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
UP SE 0.00 3.38 1.40 1.00 0.81 0.86 1.42 0.88 NA 0.94 NA 1.13 1.05 1.00 0.43 1.76 0.88 1.27 1.46 3.44











Woman, Age=30, Spouse (2nd aboard), High School, 2 jobs in life and 5 years of work experience, written, course training
FS IS Un OLF SE Com UP
FS 0 0.37 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.24 0.04 0.37 22.3 0.6
IS 0.74 0 0.4 0.03 0.1 0.08 0 0.21 6.5 0.09
Un 0.41 0.13 0 0.18 0.17 0.11 0 0.06 1.28 0
OLF 0.13 0.19 0.15 0 0.38 0.06 0.08 0.06 11.45 0.05
SE 0.65 0.19 0 0.07 0 0.06 0.02 0.13 17.3 0.16
Com 0.68 0.115 0.03 0.03 0.08 0 0.02 0.13 7.36 0.07
UP 0.34 0.02 0.06 0.36 0.11 0.11 0 0.03 5.04 0
Man, Age=45, Breadwinner, High School, 5 jobs in life and 25 years of work experience, course training
FS IS Un OLF SE Com UP
FS 0 0.36 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.37 52.7 0.62
IS 0.72 0 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.07 0 0.19 12.3 0.07
Un 0.34 0.13 0 0.17 0.29 0.06 0 0.05 1.61 0
OLF 0.11 0.1 0.14 0 0.54 0.05 0.05 0.06 8.98 0.02
SE 0.67 0.16 0 0.08 0 0.05 0.02 0.18 36.8 0.22
Com 0.62 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.17 0 0.01 0.12 14.3 0.05
UP 0.36 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.18 0 0.02 11.1 0
* Probability of entering state j given that the state i was left.
** Long run probability that the state j is entered at any transition.
*** Average length of time spent in each state, once it is entered (calculated with Weibull model).
**** Probability of the process being in each of the seven states at an arbitrary time
remote from the origin (do not depend upon which state was occupied at time 0).